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THESIS

**SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN: CIVIL MILITARY CASE
STUDIES OF THE NATO DECISION-MAKING PROCESS**

by

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June 1998

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**SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN: CIVIL MILITARY CASE
STUDIES OF THE NATO DECISION-MAKING PROCESS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was organized on a two-track structure. The military part of the Alliance was to be involved in immediate military planning for the defense of the Alliance. The NATO civilian part was to provide objectives and political coordination for the military planners. It turned out that NATO military officials achieved relatively independent positions from their civilian superiors and were able to influence political debate not only on the basis of military expertise, but also based on their own political assessment. General Lauris Norstad, who assumed the position of SACEUR in 1956, exercised a great deal of independence from his civilian superiors. During his tenure, Norstad was involved in a debate over NATO nuclear structure. He also influenced several decisions regarding the change in the NATO strategic concept. After France's departure from the NATO military structure, the Alliance adjusted its structures and created the International Military Staff. This institution proved to be very successful in influencing the NATO debate in the late 1980s. Both cases prove that the NATO military component is deeply involved in the political decision-making process.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the early days of the Cold War, the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization seemed to be the essence of the alliance. To provide sufficient answer for the Soviet Threat, members of the alliance must have agreed upon coordination of many aspects of their national domains. Moreover, the members of the NATO militaries seemed to be in a better position than their civilian counterparts to analyze, evaluate and coordinate all aspects of the NATO defense efforts. A drive to provide sufficient defense for the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization caused changes in the nature of the civil-military relations. A new situation in international relations after World War II, compelled states to abandon at least part of their sovereignty in the sensitive areas of their security policy and to subordinate the objectives of the multinational alliance. Military plans provided by this organization required adjustments in the national political, economic and military plans. Soldiers assigned to the job in NATO were no longer dependent on their national governments during their tenure. Moreover, acting for the sake of the alliance as a whole, they sometimes expressed views contradicting the opinions of their national governments. The development of the military part of NATO, somewhat independent from the national governments, created a new dimension in the history of civil-military relations. Soldiers, while acting on behalf of the alliance, were able to influence the politics of national governments.

The central question for this thesis is how these relations between the civilian and military branches of NATO were developed. Were the military members of the alliance

only disciplined subordinates of their civilian superiors, or had they, their own agendas? Did they possess the means necessary to develop their own political objectives and did they have the will to influence the outcome of political debate? The other important issue regarding relations between the civilian and military branches of NATO is an issue of the real power of the highest NATO officials:

Neither the secretary-general, nor for that matter, SACEUR, has ever been charged with the responsibility for formulating proposals concerning alliance strategy. Of course the Supreme Commander, through his military plans, his advice and preferences and through the statement of the requirements of his command, can have significant input into the formulation of alliance strategy, but the ultimate decision of what strategy is to be lies with the political authorities of the alliance. The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and of the secretary-general have laid more in the interpretation of alliance strategy to wider audiences, and in helping to secure the implementation of the strategy adopted.¹

In the reality of the Atlantic Alliance however, interpretation of the most important political documents sometimes resulted in the implementation of policies different from those pursued by some of the members. A vast margin of freedom in the interpretation of documents adopted by political authorities allowed NATO military decision-makers to influence political debate to a degree that was impossible within the national civil-military structures. Another issue that cannot be ignored, which impacted the decision-making process and civil-military relations, is technological development in the 20th century. The military expertise only gained on its gravity by providing civilian authorities with knowledge about new weapons and possible implications of its use.

¹ Paul Buteux, Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance. Theatre Nuclear Force Modernization in NATO, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p. 22.

Therefore, one might ask a question about the nature of the military component of NATO. How do the relations between civilian and military branches of NATO unfold? What is the level of independence or the level of subordination of military towards their civilian superiors? Is the military able to influence plans prepared by national governments, or develop their own agendas that may contradict these plans? What is the political power of the highest military officers? It seems that the NATO military branch was able to obtain more political power than was possible, utilizing only their power of professional expertise. History proves that although the military in the United States, Great Britain and France were subordinated to the civilian, democratic control, it does not mean that they were unable to influence the political decision-making process.²

The best example of the complicated character of civil-military relations may be the Truman-MacArthur controversy of 1951. General Douglas MacArthur was able to use the weakness of the Truman administration to conduct military operations according to his own strategic concepts and visions, which were opposed to official American policy regarding not only the Korean War but also global competition with the Soviet Union. MacArthur's ability to gain Republican political support and use it against his commander-in-chief raised new questions about civil-military relations in the United

² Civil-military relations in Germany, which became the fourth major power in the alliance, were quite different but with similar outcome. Development of modern civil-military relations in Germany is described in Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The search for tradition in the West German armed forces. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

States.³ MacArthur's actions were based on a belief, popular among American military professionals, that war is a deviation from normal international relations. Unlike Clausewitz (who introduced the concept of war as a logical continuation of state's policy), the American attitude toward war assumed "that normal relations among men, whether among individuals or men organized into states are peaceful and harmonious. Conflict is a deviation from this norm, primarily the result of wicked... autocratic rulers like Kaiser Wilhelm II, or totalitarian tyrants, like Hitler or Stalin."⁴ Therefore, war with the despots is just cause and can not be limited by political consideration. This type of war, based on universal moral principles, requires total victory and the conduct of war not limited by political restraints. Military officers, in his decisions, must be nonpolitical and conduct war "in a strictly military and technically efficient manner."⁵ This attitude resulted in neglecting the concept of a limited war. War with evil can not be limited. It must be total war, conducted until total victory is achieved. During the Korean War, General MacArthur was a devoted advocate of total war and found he was unable to subordinate himself to the restriction imposed upon him by his civilian leaders. Moreover, he openly challenged the Supreme Commander and gained support from the Republican Party, as well as, from some circles of the American public opinion. On 10 April 1951, President Harry Truman dismissed General MacArthur from all of his

³ John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1959, pp. 271-277.

⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

commands. This one move restored his power as a Supreme Commander, however, consequences of this controversy can be traced in other NATO debates over the concepts of a limited war in Europe and proper defense for this threat.

The outcome of World War II also brought changes in the nature of political leadership in case of war. War lost its regional and conventional character. Since this time, any serious consideration about the likelihood of hostilities must take into account the possible global and nuclear implications of war. These issues complicated the task of a state leader and made him much more dependent on the professional opinion of his political and military advisors. However, on the other hand, the military and political dimension of nuclear conflict became even more connected and interdependent than had been so in the past. Moreover, the end of World War II was a beginning of a new period in civil-military relations. Until that time, issues like creating or debating strategy issues or military doctrine were almost totally restricted to soldiers. After the end of the war, civilians (not necessarily political decision-makers) entered the sphere of a previously military professional only area. The names of such civilian strategists as Henry Kissinger, Bernard Brodie, B. H. Liddel Hurt and Herman Khan were some of the most famous figures.

Since war became a threat to the existence of humanity, the issue of political leadership met its ultimate challenge. The experience of World Wars I and II, however, do not give many examples of political leaders who are skillful and strong enough to

restrain ideas of military commanders.⁶ The Truman-MacArthur controversy also points to the importance of the personalities of actors in the decision-making process. President Truman did not hesitate to draw for the ultimate means at his disposal in order to restore his constitutional power and subordinate to an independent officer. One may only hypothesize about an outcome of this clash if the position of the President of the United States had been occupied by a weaker character than Harry Truman. Similar clashes between civilian and military authorities may also be observed among leaders of the alliance.

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represented a unique situation in modern history. After the end of World War II, the alliance between the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain broke apart. The political objectives of former allies revealed themselves to be too different. Further, the respective nations became more and more hostile towards one other. The former ally (Soviet Union) soon became the major threat for the weak and devastated states of Europe. After establishing its power in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union turned upon the rest of the Continent. The nations of Western Europe believed that without external help they would be unable to defend themselves against this new threat.

⁶ Gordon A. Craig, "The Political Leader as a Strategist," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 481-509.

The only nation that could provide Western Europe with sufficient means of defense was the United States of America.⁷ After World War II, this country emerged as the sole state able to resist the political, military and economic pressure of the Soviet Union. The weakness of Western Europe proved most alarming during the winter of 1946-47 when all Western European countries depended wholly on American help for mere survival. However severe the living conditions in a devastated Europe were, it was mainly the Soviet drive to enlarge its empire and not economic poverty that helped create the Atlantic Alliance.⁸ The Soviet activity was not focused on the European continent exclusively. The Soviets were believed to be pursuing a worldwide communist empire.⁹

⁷ The U. S. economic and military preponderance in NATO was overwhelming. In 1950, the United States was the only nuclear power in the alliance, and its overall military strength (measured in terms of defense spending) was far greater than that of all other NATO allies combined (\$17.7 billion versus \$8.9 billion). Ten years later, the ratio had actually increased by almost 3 to 1 (\$45.4 billion versus \$15.9 billion). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all NATO allies combined reached only 77 percent of the U. S. GDP in 1950; it increased to 91 percent in 1960. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on U. S. Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 16.

⁸ Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance, New York, NY: Twayne Publishers, 1994, pp. 3-4.

⁹ "From Washington's vantage point, it appeared that the Soviets were on the move everywhere in the immediate postwar years not only in Eastern Europe and Western Europe, but in the Middle East and Asia as well. Indeed the perception of the Communist threat in Europe was in part driven by developments in these other regions. In Iran, the United States and the Soviet Union had come uncomfortably close to conflict over Soviet demands for oil concessions and support for a revolt in the northern province of Azerbaijan. In China, where American policy had been an excruciating failure, the indigenous Communists were steadily advancing. In Korea, American and Russian occupation troops faced each other across the thirty-eighth parallel. Furthermore, many of the victorious allies were plagued by empire problems." Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990, p. 6.

Given this situation, America could not return to its traditional policy of “no entangling alliances with Europe” after the end of conflict. It turned out to be necessary for the U. S. to assist Europe with at least economic aid. But economic aid didn't seem to be enough. The period of time that Europe required for economic recovery would be long. Severe economic problems might have been easily used by the Soviets to get full control over the rest of Europe. The original threat posed by a resurgent Germany was replaced by the “Red Scare.”

The events of the second half of the 1940s in Europe, as well as in the Far East, pushed America and Western Europe into the direction of creating a very unique institution – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This organization had been created in unusual circumstances in the realm of international security policy. These specific circumstances influenced the shape of NATO. The end of World War II, the Soviet Threat and the development of nuclear weapons created a situation in which many states were forced to redefine their basic assumptions of national security and international relations.

The challenge the NATO members were facing since the outbreak of the Cold War forced them to increase mutual political, as well as, military cooperation. In the beginning of the Atlantic Alliance, it seemed that military cooperation would be the most important part of the alliance activity. Since the immediate threat was, in great part, military in nature, this aspect of the alliance got priority. However, leaders of the alliance soon discovered that such a military alliance required political and economic cooperation. Besides, the nature of the threat forced all members of the alliance to overcome their

respective traditional military arrangements for the benefit of the whole alliance. In other words, the level of cooperation must have been sufficient for the level of threat. It turned out that soon after the development of NATO, a traditional, war-time alliance would not suffice in these circumstances.

The creation of NATO was not possible without the significant engagement of the United States with the problems of post-World War II Europe. The major obstacle for this engagement had been the traditional American policy of isolation from European affairs. Among the many other adjustments and shifts in the post World War II world, the change of American policy toward Europe was one of the most important.

The major shift in American foreign policy was introduced boldly by President Truman:

In a nineteen-minute speech before Congress on the afternoon of 12 March 1947, President Harry S. Truman revolutionized American foreign policy. He boldly asserted, 'it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities from outside pressures...'. The Marshall Plan, announced at Harvard University on 5 June 1947 by the Secretary of the State bearing its name, provided the economic backbone for Truman's commitment. The United States contributed \$13 billion, mostly in free grants, for the reconstruction of Western Europe. The investment also paved the way for the establishment of the military backbone for the Truman Doctrine: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹⁰

World War II not only changed the political architecture of Europe, but the whole world. The outcome of the war, the collapse of old colonial empires and the establishment of the bipolar world order with two competing superpowers had influenced the traditional political, social, economic and military relations in many countries around

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

the world. Despite the bias against “American mass-culture,” European countries needed American help: economic, political and military. Economic relief was obtained through the Marshall Plan announced on 5 June 1947. The political and military assistance was to be achieved via NATO.

II. NATO'S FIRST YEARS

This chapter describes the global political relations after the end of World War II, the breakdown of the wartime alliance between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty. It also examines events that influenced the transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty from a loose alliance into a more cohesive organization. The following will describe the original institutional arrangements within this organization. In particular, positions of the civilian and military pillars of NATO and their relationship to one another.

A. POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 1950S

The perception of Soviet foreign policy after the end of the war in Europe caused the continental powers of the United Kingdom and France to feel that they desperately needed American help.¹¹ Soviet hostile intentions towards the unconquered part of the continent were so obvious that American political and military presence in Europe was almost unanimously accepted and welcomed by their European allies.

The British politicians, most probably, were the first to figure out that they needed the Americans if they were to survive. In the opinion of Elizabeth D. Sherwood:

...in early 1947, the inevitable retreat commenced as the British began to shrink their global responsibilities and reduce their overseas commitments: on 14 February they referred the Palestine question to the United Nations; on 18 February they announced the end of the Raj [sic]; and on 21 February they told the United States that they would no longer be able to finance or police the precarious situations in Greece and Turkey. These

¹¹ Kaplan, pp. 6-11.

developments heralded the postwar transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana.¹²

It wasn't only the situation in Great Britain that changed the traditionally isolationist policy of the United States government and the attitude of the American people. The situation in Great Britain reflected the economic situation in other European countries. Besides economic crisis, there was a lot of political confusion and deep disappointment over traditional political systems and institutions. This sense of disappointment may explain the success of Communist Parties in France and Italy.¹³

The situation in Western Europe was not the only factor that influenced the shift in American foreign policy. To a lesser extent, the developments in Eastern Europe changed the attitude of American policymakers towards cooperation with Soviet Russia as well. Despite all public declarations, the issue of the future of Eastern Europe was not very important to Roosevelt's policy.¹⁴ His main goal was to achieve cooperation with Stalin for a new worldwide organization that would settle all disputes in accordance with

¹² Sherwood, p. 6.

¹³ "France and Italy also were destitute and unstable, and their respective Communist parties were making inroads on desolate political landscapes. In France, Communist leaders held cabinet posts in a series of coalition governments from 1945 through 1947. In Italy the Communists party in 1945 had 1.7 million members; in the first postwar elections in June 1946 the Communists and Socialists together received nearly 40 percent of popular vote." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ "With Harriman, FDR was franker still. Harriman remarked in November 1944, 'the President consistently shows very little interests in Eastern European matters except as they affect sentiment in America.' On another occasion, Roosevelt told Harriman 'that he didn't care whether the countries bordering Russia became communized or not.' John L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 89.

the will of the three great powers. It seems that the public opinion in the West was more concerned with the overwhelming communist activity all around the world rather than the political successes of the Communist Party in various countries.¹⁵

Moreover, the countries that kept political control over the greater part of the world until the outbreak of the World War II were no longer able to meet this obligation after 1945. Major colonial empires were gradually losing control over their colonies.¹⁶ In this situation, there was no question that the only power that was able to resist the Soviets on a global scale was the United States of America. The U. S. economy and society did not suffer from the hostilities of the war but had recovered during this period of economic crisis of the 1920s and 30s. It alone was able to support destroyed European economies. However, there was one significant obstacle to the smooth introduction of a new global superpower. This obstacle was the traditional attitude of American society towards overseas alliances and the entanglement of America in European affairs.

¹⁵ "More important, the fate of Eastern Europe raised the specter of Communist domination of the entire continent.... By 1947, Moscow increasing domination of Bulgaria, the eastern sector of Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania testified to the reality of the direct and indirect Soviet threat to a free Europe. From the Washington's vantage point, it appeared that the Soviets were everywhere in the immediate postwar years, not only in Eastern Europe and Western Europe, but in the Middle East and Asia as well. Indeed, the perception of Communist threat in Europe was in part driven by developments in these other regions." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁶ "Furthermore, many of the victorious allies were plagued by empire problems. The British were losing the jewel in their crown, India; the French faced unrest in Indochina; the Dutch struggled with an uprising in Indonesia. The general international turmoil hastened the emergence of the United States as the new guarantor of Western global interests." *Ibid.*, p. 7.

After the experiences of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations (1919-1939), European politicians were determined to avoid the same mistake for a second time in a row. They believed that it was the absence of the United States in Europe during the interwar period that allowed Hitler to conquer the greater part of the continent. Certain American politicians shared this sentiment, and some of them (Roosevelt, Acheson, Kennan) believed that America could no longer delay involvement in European affairs. During the war, Roosevelt, as well as others, were trying to establish the foundations for new global world order, an agreement of superpowers that would prevent the development of new war.¹⁷ This institution was supposed to be the United Nations. However, the outcome did not meet the expectations of the founders due to procedural problems, but mainly because of political as well as ideological differences.

From just after World War II, European politicians were occupied with creating an international institution that would prevent the repetition of the years 1919-1939. The first attempts were directed more at the past rather than into the future. In 1947, France and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The provisions of the treaty obligated both sides to coordinate their efforts against a possible hostile Germany. The

¹⁷ “The fact is that Stalin’s European aims-Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, a dismembered Germany, a weakened Western Europe, friendly relations with Britain coincided with Roosevelt’s. Stalin favored a *Dreikaiserbündnis* -- an American-British-Russian alliance... Stalin’s biggest concession in Yalta was on the issue of greatest concern to Roosevelt, the UN voting formula. Stalin allowed Roosevelt to return home with a prize for his Wilsonian supporters. Roosevelt insisted on free election and the broadening of the Lublin (now Warsaw) government, but with the realization that these were largely matters of form. Form was important for domestic opinion, just as the much publicized ‘Declaration on Liberated Europe’ had no enforcement mechanism.” Harper, p. 124.

developments of that year provided diplomats with more of a sense of the problems of European policy. In the opinion of Lawrence S. Kaplan, “the complete failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, primarily concerning the settlement of divided Germany, signaled a moment of decision to strengthen western European community for Georges Bidault and Ernest Bevin.”¹⁸ After that, the snowball effect of events pushed for further developments. On January 22, British Prime Minister Bevin delivered a speech to the House of Commons in which he announced that Great Britain would abandon her traditional policy of “splendid isolation” from the Continent. Great Britain would also establish, together with France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, a political community that would also be open to the other Europeans in time.¹⁹ This announcement, which finally led to signing of the Brussels Pact on 17 March 1948, reflects the amount of fear sensed by European diplomats and policymakers. Britain, in one bold move, broke with her one hundred year old traditional policy and joined a political and military pact whose heart was “a promise of mutual support in the event of armed attack.”²⁰ Although neither the Bevin speech nor the text of the Brussels Pact made any remarks about future relationship between the members of the treaty and the United States, America played a vital role in developing this treaty.

After the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 12 April 1945, Harry Truman became the President of the United States of America. He did not share Roosevelt’s

¹⁸ Kaplan, p. 17.

¹⁹ Ibid., p 17.

²⁰ Ibid., p 17.

sentiment toward Soviet Russia and friendly cooperation with Stalin. On 12 March 1947, in a nineteen-minute speech, Truman announced what was later to be known as a “Truman Doctrine” and requested that Congress provide financial aid for Greece and Turkey. On 5 June 1947, the Secretary of State in Truman’s administration, George C. Marshall, announced at Harvard University a plan for economic assistance for Europe. According to Elizabeth D. Sherwood, both events paved the way for the development of a closer alliance between the United States and Western Europe.²¹

It seems that the crucial moment for the development of NATO and deeper American involvement in Europe occurred during the *coup d'etat* in Prague in February 1948. Czechoslovakia, although already under Soviet control, was perceived as an independent country. In the opinion of Lawrence S. Kaplan, the perception of the coup was that this event constituted either the final breakdown of cooperation among the great powers or an open challenge toward the West.²² After the coup, Western Europe originated the process of western consolidation by signing the Brussels Pact on 17 March 1948, which linked “...Britain, France, and the Benelux countries to a 50-year treaty.

²¹ Sherwood, p. 7.

²² “Events of the winter of 1948 pushed the United States into close collaboration. Three crises, or anticipated crises, galvanized the West. The first and most dramatic was the coup d'etat in Prague in February that ended the valiant attempts of Czech democracy under President Eduard Benes to survive in the face of Soviet pressures... The coup summoned images of ruthless Soviet aggression, squeezing victims by external pressure and internal subversion...” The fate of Czechoslovakia was a warning that Europe could not withstand Communist intimidation without an American guarantee. Kaplan, p. 19.

The heart of the arrangement was a promise of mutual support in the event of armed attack.”²³

The next logical step in this process was to link Europe and the United States. This objective, despite the vast opposition of the proponents of traditional American isolation, was achieved on 4 April 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in Washington D.C. One of the first long-term problems for the alliance was the issue of the alliance force structure. Due to the great Soviet advantage in conventional weapons as well as the economic weakness of Europe, most European NATO members inclined toward heavy dependence on the American “nuclear umbrella.” But when the Soviets broke the U. S. monopoly of nuclear weapons soon thereafter in August 1949, an issue of nuclear strategy within the Alliance became the source of constant civil-military conflict among the allies.

The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 soon proved to be more than just an alliance for war. Institutions of this type usually have the rather limited goals of defending member states against a common threat or to defeat a mutual enemy. Unlike these organizations, NATO seemed to be organized upon a “dual-track.” The first pillar of the NATO was designed to provide the member-states with a convenient and efficient way of negotiation and establishing common policy with respect to the main goals of the Alliance. Contrary to the World War II alliance, mutual contacts and the formulation of common policy was supposed to be developed on a more formal, permanent basis.

²³ Ibid. p. 17.

Although in 1949-1950 NATO existed mainly as a treaty, not an organization, after 1950-1951, it was clear that a stronger commitment was necessary.

From the very beginning, the impact of the military “pillar” of NATO seemed to be more important than mere military cooperation not only on purely military issues, but also on political problems. To some extent, military contacts were able to fill the vacuum in political contacts. Since the Foreign Ministers of the respective countries could not meet on permanent basis, the impact of the military bodies was greater, though they focused more on “technical” and not political problems.²⁴ The other important factor, which influenced the shape of the Atlantic Alliance (especially in its early days), was the huge political, economic and military dominance of the United States over their allies. Due to its great resources, the United States could not avoid dominance of the alliance. However, the experience of wartime cooperation helped restrain the natural tendency to avoid a time-consuming consultation and instead just simply dictate political and military orders. Nevertheless, the military structure of the alliance reflected the American supremacy. The position of the highest-ranking military official in the alliance was reserved for an American officer. Although other members of the alliance delegated their soldiers to the structures of NATO, American dominance was beyond discussion.

²⁴ “Aside from the support units, the most significant result of the first months of NATO was the work of the Military Committee. Unlike the NATO Council and the Defense Committee, composed of foreign and defense ministers of each nation respectively, the Military Committee was made up of chiefs of staff who could devote much more time to NATO problems than their civilian chiefs, who would meet infrequently and who were preoccupied for the most part with other concerns. The Military Committee and particularly the three-nation Standing Group, its executive arm, was to be major institution planning NATO defense?” *Ibid.*, p. 36.

However, the U. S. government could not just simply dictate to its allies what they should or should not do. Although heavily dependent on U. S. aid, the European members of the Alliance expressed their own opinions and demanded partnership relations. Besides, from the very beginning of its existence, NATO was more than merely a military alliance. Soon the Alliance served effectively for goals other than just military and political cooperation and consultations. Usually wartime alliances, after achieving their immediate goals, are disbanded. Without a common enemy, the political goals of member states seem to be very distant from each other or even contradictory. This reality was probably the case during the World War II anti-Nazi coalition. After the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945, the alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States broke down very soon and was never to be restored again. However, it was not only a common threat that had brought the United States, Great Britain and France together. Thomas Risse-Kappen argues:

...that the North Atlantic Alliance represents an institutionalization of the security community among democracies. While the perceived Soviet threat certainly strengthened the sense of common purpose among the allies, it didn't create the community in the first place. NATO was proceeded by the wartime alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and France, which also closely collaborated to create various postwar regimes in the economic and security areas.²⁵

Thus, this close cooperation was possible due to mutually accepted values and trust.

²⁵ Risse-Kappen, p. 32.

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being.²⁶

One of the most important objectives of NATO was the creation of common political goals against a communist offensive in Europe. A newly designed network of political institutions was supposed to allow extensive political consultations. Additionally, the wide chain of military institutions was to prepare the Alliance for military confrontation with what later became known as the “Evil Empire.”

B. ESTABLISHING NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, STAFF AND COMMAND

The Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 required the member states to create a military organization consisting of 12 national entities. To give the treaty the credibility necessary for effective defense, there loomed the need to create a military organization as fast as possible. The beginning, however, was less than impressive. When General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) arrived in January 1951, NATO basically consisted of a treaty and a lot of wishful thinking. Eisenhower’s first task was to give momentum to creating the real power of the Alliance from scratch.²⁷ An additional obstacle to that task was the serious economic

²⁶ The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, in NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1994, p. 231.

²⁷ “The challenges were real; there was a definite possibility of failure. The only firm decision that NATO Council of Ministers had made was that they wanted Eisenhower as their commander. But of what? A multinational force? Independent national armies joined together in the loose alliance? How many troops? Where would they come from...? And although few dared to say that in public, all the NATO partners knew that

situation in Europe combined with the overwhelming feeling of hopelessness.

Eisenhower's answer for these feelings was remarkable:

I know that there are shortages, but I myself make up for part of the shortage -- what I can do and what I can put into this -- and the rest of it has to be made by you people. Now get at it!²⁸

It was necessary to create a staff of international officers ready to work for NATO. According to the Lord Lindsay P. H. Ismay, great help came from the Western Union, which faced this issue earlier. The experience of creating an international and inter-service staff turned out to be crucial at the early stages of the NATO military structure.²⁹ For Eisenhower himself, the experience of multinational cooperation was not unusual. His cooperation with the British during World War II helped him deal with this issue.

Eisenhower was aware from the very beginning that his work and the job of his staff was very unique. While there was a precedent for close military cooperation and coordination from World Wars I and II, creating a peacetime politico-military organization was very unique and challenging.³⁰ Very few people at that time dared to

NATO would never be able to match the threat from the east without German troops.” Robert S. Jordan, Generals in International Politics, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, p. 11.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁹ Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954, Paris: NATO Information Service, 1954, p. 38. This opinion is supported by Douglas L. Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance. A Study of Structure and Strategy, New York, NY: Preager Publishers, 1991, p. 110.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 29-91.

contest the idea of a nation-state with ultimate authority regarding its security issues. To accomplish these required objectives, they had to achieve new level of international cooperation in peacetime:

Eisenhower was also highly conscious of the unique and indeed unprecedented leadership role that he and his staff were assuming, and he wanted to make certain that those around him understood the need for unity. He told them that he wished to make clear that once a man had been accepted on his staff, he no longer would have an official nationality.³¹

This issue must have, however, created two additional and different problems. First, there was an issue of national representation. It was completely out of the question to build an international security organization without national representation regarding military and defense issues. Eisenhower seemed to be fully aware of this need. He insisted that despite officers being assigned to the international staff, who should be as much as possible independent from their government, respective countries should assign an additional number of officers whose major objective would be to represent the national point of view.³² Later, SACEURs maintained the same position. Moreover, the civilian staff members, before they were officially assigned to a post in SHAPE, had to “...sign a declaration undertaking not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of... duties from any government or from any authority other than the

³¹ Jordan, Generals in International Politics., p. 21.

³² “But Eisenhower persisted. He told that SHAPE officers could not represent their ministers of defense or anyone else as staff. He did plan, however, to have someone at his headquarters representing the national points of view, someone who would be free to come and go to his own national defense establishment and report what was taking place, including developments and plans.” *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Organization/Headquarters.”³³ It was obvious that this sort of requirement would face opposition from national governments, which weren’t used to ceding their sovereign authority regarding national security issues. However, Eisenhower insisted and when respective governments requested the testimony of officers from the international staff, he refused permission.³⁴ However, there was one exemption from this strict rule. This exemption was the SACEUR himself. Because of his “dual hat” position (every SACEUR was at the same time Commander in Chief, Europe, CINCEUR), he was responsible to his own government and testified many times before the U. S. Congress.³⁵ SACEUR, as the highest military in NATO, testified not only before the U. S. Congress, but also before other national parliaments. Therefore, one cannot claim that with respect to that issue SACEUR was responsible only before the United States. Keeping various governments informed was one of Ike’s primary objectives.³⁶

Additionally, his position as SACEUR (and that of his successors) proved to have more power than it was originally designed:

...although it was established that supreme commanders would have very limited command authority in peacetime, Eisenhower’s extensive preparatory responsibilities gave him and his successors, great potential

³³ NATO/SHAPE Civilian Personnel Regulation, Article 13.1. In Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 23.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁶ “He carried out a brutal schedule to meet it-press conferences and numerous trips to the various capitals, where he was careful to talk not only to government figures but also to opposition party leaders, trade union officials, intellectuals and molders of public opinion.” Ibid., p. 23.

powers. Eisenhower insisted on and obtained direct access to all chiefs of defense and authority to communicate directly with defense ministers and heads of government to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission.³⁷

One has to admit that the unique position of SACEUR gave him vast opportunities to influence the policy of the Atlantic Alliance. However strong the position of the SACEUR at that time appeared, his power by no means can be described as unlimited. One of the major limitations for the SACEUR was, at the early stage of NATO development, a lack of military staff dealing with issues important for NATO performance, but not directly involved with problems of combat.

Nevertheless, the devastated European economy was one of the major obstacles to the pursuit of military power in Europe to deter the Soviet threat. Because of the collapse of industry, it was virtually impossible for Europe to undertake a large military buildup. Despite that, the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon approved on 23-25 February 1952 a plan of ambitious military goals.³⁸ Despite all the efforts of the first SACEUR, the Lisbon declaration on NATO force goals have never been met. Difficult economic circumstances gave European NATO members a good excuse not to live up to their words with respect to the build up of armed forces. Moreover, problems with building strong conventional military structure increased because promised American financial

³⁷ Bland, p. 149.

³⁸ “Fifty divisions, four thousands aircraft, and 704 combat vessels by 1952; seventy five divisions and sixty five hundred aircraft by 1953, ninety six divisions and nine thousands aircraft by 1954, with thirty five to forty divisions to be ready for combat at all times.” Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 28.

assistance had not reached its destination on time.³⁹ But from the very beginning of the alliance's existence, there was an alternative to the large, expensive standing armies. This alternative was the nuclear weapon.⁴⁰ The European members of NATO did not enjoy a nuclear advantage for long.⁴¹ The inevitable consequence for NATO and the world of Soviet nuclear weapons was the nuclear arms race:

To meet this new challenge (Russian nuclear bomb) the Atomic Energy Commission met in October to consider a crash program that not only would expand the atomic stockpile but also explore the building of a hydrogen bomb... A new special committee of the National Security Council, composed of Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, and David Lilienthal, formed in November 1949, reversed the Oppenheimer committee's recommendation on the assumption that the Soviets would build the thermonuclear bomb whether or not the United States went ahead with the program.⁴²

³⁹ "America's own fiscal reservation set the tone, and in the first six months of 1950 there was no compelling reason to jar the allies from complacency. It was hardly noticeable, let alone conceived as a problem, that as of 6 April only \$42 million of the \$1.3 billion authorized for military assistance had been committed." *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴⁰ While the allies recognized the inadequacies of their efforts, there was still a reason for the optimism many excluded at the time. Essentially it rested on the assumption that no Soviet invasion was imminent in 1949 or in 1950. Second, the defense of Europe did not really depend on the numbers of troops gathered or on quantity of arms at hand. It depended rather on atomic umbrella that the U. S. commitment gave to NATO: the assumption that the American B-29s flying out of Omaha, Nebraska, and carrying atomic bombs, protected the alliance at all times as they deterred the Soviet Union from hostile action against the West. Beneath this umbrella the allies had breathing space to proceed leisurely. Excessive spending on military budgets to achieve the goals of the MTDP (Medium-Term Defense Plan) might damage economic recovery. *Kaplan*, p. 38.

⁴¹ The Soviet Union broke the United States atomic monopoly with a test in August 1949. A number of years would have to pass before this would turn into an atomic stockpile, but the eventual Soviet accumulation of such a stockpile was virtually inevitable. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1989, p. 63.

⁴² *Kaplan*, p. 39.

Besides the issue of a nuclear arms race, the second factor, which pushed the alliance into the build up of armed forces, was the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The perception of this war, especially in the United States, created anti-Communist hysteria. For the American public and probably to some extent the political establishments, the Communists in Europe and in Asia were part of a global communist conspiracy. “The enemy was the same; the Soviet Union was perceived to control The People’s Republic of China and North Korea as thoroughly as it controlled Poland or East Germany.”⁴³

The biggest threat for Europe was that the situation on the Korean Peninsula would shift American attention and resources from Europe. The conduct of military operations fully supported these threats. The Korean War didn’t shift American attention to Asia but became the factor that enhanced NATO’s organizational performance.⁴⁴

However, the impact of the Korean War was not the sole factor that changed NATO objectives with respect to force goals. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, President Truman formally approved National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC-68) on 31 January 1950. In its evaluation of the global competition with the Communism, NSC-68 recommended a significant increase in American military spending. The authors of the document feared that without rapid increases in the defense

⁴³ Ibid., p. 41.

⁴⁴ “It didn’t matter that the action in Korea may not have been a preview of Soviet plans for Europe, or even that Stalin may not have had as much control over North Korea as Truman administration assumed in 1950. The perception of that control governed NATO’s reactions, and widespread change in that organization resulted.” Ibid., p. 42.

budget, the Soviet Union might overrun Europe by 1952.⁴⁵ Additionally, NATO's overall structure needed to be improved and made simple. Chaos and competition among various NATO agencies had to be eliminated.⁴⁶

During the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon in February 1952, the decision with regard to the number and structure of forces had been approved. Besides the decision on an immediate military buildup of the alliance, the reorganization of NATO had been accepted. Decisions undertaken at Lisbon concerned mainly the civilian branch of NATO. Its military structure had been discussed and approved a year earlier by NAC but the civilian part of NATO didn't fully exist at the time. Ultimately, the position of the secretary general of the alliance was established and the first person to be appointed was Lord Lindsay P. H. Ismay.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ "The result was the formulation of the most important NSC paper of the decade, NSC-68. It was the work of the State Department, particularly of Paul Nitze, chairman of the Policy Planning Staff, rather than the Defense Department representative, and it spoke to Dean Acheson's belief that the current budgets were unrealistic in light of the present and future dangers to the nation... There was a doomsday quality to the report that feared a Soviet overrunning of Europe as early as 1952 unless the administration considered the expansion of the percentage of the gross national product devoted to the defense from 20 percent in peacetime to over half in total." *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁶ "Indeed, the committee's, which should themselves be models of integration within the alliance, were the very opposite. The Defense Financial and Economic Committee had its headquarters in Rome, while the Military Production and Supply Board was centered in London and the Standing Group of the Military Committee worked out of the Pentagon in Washington. There was little coordination among them." *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴⁷ "Ultimately, the council agreed at Lisbon on 11 February 1952 to appoint a secretary-general responsible to the council and supervising the work of an international staff/secretariat. The council deputies in turn would be replaced by permanent representatives and the Defense Production Board and Financial and Economic Board would be incorporated into the activities of the secretariat and staff. Among the

The final establishment of civilian and military NATO agendas finished the process of original designation of the alliance. Its character and nature at this early stage of development may be described as a mainly military-type of alliance. The position of the military part of NATO seemed to be stronger than its civilian equivalent. The fact that military agendas were developed much earlier than that of the civilian probably reflected the original idea of NATO. The overwhelming sense of the Soviet threat pushed respective nations, some of them previously hostile to each other, moved toward mutual collaboration. On the other hand, this cooperation would be much harder without already existing sense of community. However, all members of the alliance did not always obey the sense of common values, thus allowing broader cooperation than in the case of mutual superstitions. Another factor that may explain the character of the early days of NATO is an issue of military and political strategy. Although both were officially adopted in December 1956, in reality, the alliance had to rely on American strategy as described in NSC-68. Again, the reason was the heavy dependence on American military assistance in the early days of NATO. Post-war economic weakness was combined with intellectual backwardness with respect to the nuclear weapons. At this time the United States was the only country possessing nuclear weapons which would only strengthen the desire of Europeans for protection. Especially when confronted with the possibility of a massive Soviet conventional attack. However, the Soviet Union broke the U. S. monopoly of nuclear weapons soon after the establishment

important tasks of the secretary-general was chairing the meetings of permanent representatives and preparing the council itself.” Ibid., p. 48.

of the alliance. Still a conventional type war persisted as a major threat to the security of Western Europe.

The allies' answer for this kind of threat was not unified. On the one hand, European countries underestimated the reliance on American nuclear weapons. On the other hand, American officials from the very beginning of NATO, insisted on a more balanced (conventional to nuclear) force structure. The insistence of Europeans on nuclear weapons was to some extent caused by economic factors. Basically, a conventional force build up was much more expensive than relying on American nuclear dominance.⁴⁸ For European countries it was virtually impossible to match the estimated 175 Soviet divisions with a possible reinforcement of up to 300 divisions. Nuclear weapons seemed to provide a solution for a sufficient defense at reasonable costs. Given this assumption, the Eisenhower administration proceeded with the "New Look" policy.⁴⁹ They supported a reduction of NATO's conventional forces as well as the equipment of NATO troops by substituting tactical nuclear weapons for them. European governments quickly followed suit. The most important supposition of the "New Look" was the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons. Using this kind of weapon was

⁴⁸ The Soviet Union's emergence as a nuclear power in August 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, however, soon called into question the wisdom of NATO's exclusive reliance on U. S. strategic nuclear forces for security, and led to NATO's evolution into an integrated military organization. Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s, London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 11.

⁴⁹ "The attractiveness of a 'maximum deterrent at a bearable cost' led to the 'New Look' of 1953-54, in which NATO commanders were authorized to base their plans on the prompt use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack, regardless of whether the Warsaw Pact used them or not." Ibid., p. 12.

supposed to allow NATO to “...achieve its security objectives without meeting the Lisbon force goals.”⁵⁰ Even though the “New Look” policy was criticized from the beginning for its lack of credibility, some European governments quickly decided to take advantage of the new American strategy and developed their own nuclear forces:

The British government was the first to recognize the potential implications of the multiplication and diversification of nuclear weapons for NATO strategy. During the spring of 1952, the British Chiefs of Staff conducted a comprehensive review of British global commitments and strategy, taking into account the rapid development of atomic weapons and of U. S. strategic air power as well as the tremendous financial burden imposed by rearmament.⁵¹

The conclusion from this assessment was that adopting tactical nuclear forces might enable European governments to fulfill their obligations with respect to security goals without necessarily paying the costs of a conventional arms race. However, there were many critics who disagreed with relying on massive retaliation as a main assumption of the “New Look.” The main objective they raised was:

...that the credibility of American strategic nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent to more limited forms of aggression would decline as the Soviet Union developed its own strategic nuclear forces. More flexible American forces were required, therefore to deter limited conflicts.⁵²

⁵⁰ Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 105.

⁵¹ John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, p.77.

⁵² William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements for Deterrence (Memorandum No. 7), Princeton, NJ: Center for International Studies, 15 November 1954, in Stromseth, p. 13.

Despite this criticism, in December 1954, the North Atlantic Council approved the Military Committee document 48 (MC 48) which recognized growing significance of tactical nuclear weapons and:

...authorized the NATO military authorities to base their plans and preparations on the assumption that large numbers of these new weapons would probably be used from the outset of any future conflict in Europe. Because the tremendous destructive power of tactical nuclear weapons would compensate for the alliance's presumed inferiority in conventional forces, MC 48 offered the hope that a truly forward defense of the region might finally be realizable.⁵³

These decisions, taken in the first half of 1950s, did not stop the debate within the alliance regarding credibility of NATO defense, relationship between America and her European allies, and last but not least consistence of the alliance. It turned out that it was the beginning of the long debate, which lasted until the late 1960s and, indeed, beyond.

C. ORIGINS AND FIRST ATTEMPTS TO REVISE NATO STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION – NATO CIVIL-MILITARY STRIFE

Critics of the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" did not prevent NATO from the growing reliance on nuclear weapons as an ultimate means of defense against an all-out attack from the Soviet Union. The next major NATO document regarding nuclear strategy, adopted in December 1956, Military Committee Document MC 14/2, confirmed this dependence. Moreover, during the same meeting, "...the defense ministers of France, the Netherlands, Turkey and Britain requested that American tactical nuclear weapons be made available for European forces."⁵⁴

⁵³ Duffield, p. 75.

⁵⁴ Stromseth, p. 18.

However, at the same time NATO was introducing its strategic concept, second thoughts regarding the reliance on “Massive Retaliation” appeared. Two major factors influenced considerations regarding possible modification of the NATO doctrine. First, it was a growing Soviet nuclear arsenal. The second was the launching of the first Soviet earth-orbiting satellite *Sputnik* in October 1957. The combination of both made it clear to the U. S. government as well as the American public that the American continent was vulnerable to a nuclear attack.⁵⁵ This conclusion brought concerns about possible implications for an American security policy. The revision of an American security policy, with respect to the new international security environment, had wide support among the American security establishment. Among U. S. armed forces, only representatives of the Air Force insisted on the continuation of the current policy. Nevertheless, despite growing doubts among the political establishment, President Eisenhower supported voices demanding the continuation of MC 14/2.⁵⁶

Among those who saw the necessity for a change was Eisenhower's protégé, General Lauris Norstad. Then SACEUR, Norstad “wanted sufficient conventional forces to ensure that minor border incidents or probing actions would not automatically compel a nuclear response.”⁵⁷ Norstad, although an Air Force General, supported views and opinions that contradicted the official position of his own service. Moreover, he

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

expressed opinions that contradicted not only the official position of his government, but also the personal opinion of his patron President Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁵⁸

Two major factors influenced NATO's decision about conducting revision of its former strategy. First, Stalin's death in March 1953 brought about a relaxation of tension in international relations. The decreasing level of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula allowed hope for the end of the "Cold War." The second factor, probably as important as the first, was the economic burden of conventional military spending that was particularly strong in Britain. Among the NATO countries, it was Britain that was a leader for greater reliance on strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons instead of the more expensive and less efficient conventional forces.⁵⁹

The first attempts to introduce this cheaper solution in order to solve the problem of the cost of defense emerged as early as 1952.⁶⁰ However, Britain was not alone in her attempts to reduce the overly optimistic objectives of the force goals approved at the Lisbon NAC meeting. During the 1952 presidential campaign, John Foster Dulles attacked the strategy of containment and proposed the "New Look" military strategy. His views were supported later by President Eisenhower:

⁵⁸ Edward L. Rowny, Decision-Making Process in NATO, Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1977, p.189.

⁵⁹ The inherent difficulty of achieving the objectives set at Lisbon and a declining sense of threat had stimulated considerable interest in finding an economically less burdensome alternative strategic concept, and hopes that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons might reduce the alliance's need for conventional forces emerged as early as 1952, especially in Britain." Duffield, p.76.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

In the spring of 1953, the President announced that, in order to bring economic and military necessities 'into some kind of realistic focus,' defense planning would now be based on maintaining adequate preparedness over a period of years rather than achieving maximum strength by a 'magic critical year.'⁶¹

After this speech, Eisenhower authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1953:

...to base their plans on using tactical and strategic nuclear weapons against conventional attacks wherever this was militarily advantageous... On the basis of this decision, the administration gained the approval of the Joint chiefs for a substantially reduced defense budget, based upon a greater allocation of resources to nuclear striking power at the expense of conventional arms and ground forces.⁶²

While conducting this policy, the United States appeared to be in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, they tried to restrain their NATO allies from overly relying on nuclear weapons and neglecting conventional buildup. On the other hand, the United States' policy on force structure promoted an increase in the nuclear stockpile rather than an increase in conventional forces. This type of strategic concept was widely accepted in Europe, mainly in Britain:

During the spring of 1952, the British Chiefs of Staff conducted a comprehensive review of British global commitments and strategy, taking into account the rapid development of atomic weapons and of U. S. strategic air power as well as the tremendous financial burden imposed by rearmament. They concluded that the forces NATO could afford to acquire by 1954, only amounted to a fraction of those required under the existing strategic concept. If backed by the use of tactical nuclear weapons, it would be sufficient to resist a Soviet invasion on Western Europe until the impact of the strategic counteroffensive was felt.⁶³

⁶¹ Osgood, p. 103.

⁶² Ibid., p. 103.

⁶³ Duffield, p. 78.

However, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff did not support this analysis, which paved the way toward the adoption of MC 48.

In December 1954, the North Atlantic Council approved Military Committee document number 48 (MC 48). It:

...authorized the NATO military authorities to base their plans and preparations on the assumptions that the large numbers of these weapons [tactical nuclear weapons] would probably be used from the outset of any future conflict in Europe. Because the tremendous destructive power of tactical nuclear weapons would compensate for the alliance's presumed inferiority in conventional forces, MC 48 offered the hope that a truly forward defense of the region might finally be realizable.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, MC 48 never had a chance to become widely accepted NATO strategic doctrine. According to John S. Duffield "...pressures for modifying NATO's military posture yet again emerged even before the ink was dry on MC 48."⁶⁵ The primary concern was the originally advertised advantages of tactical nuclear weapons. Opponents of this concept pointed out that since the Soviets would acquire tactical nuclear weapons of their own, the potential advantages for the West of using these weapons would decline. Besides reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO might result in the U. S. with the alternative "...of doing nothing or responding in a way that would invite Soviet nuclear retaliation."⁶⁶ These critical views quickly found supporters among

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 113.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.112-113.

members of Eisenhower's administration.⁶⁷ However, economic factors again forced some governments, especially the British, to seek means that would enable the replacement of expensive conventional forces. The British drive to alter NATO strategy was motivated mainly by domestic economic problems.⁶⁸ While other European members of the Alliance wanted to reduce conventional forces and access to nuclear weapons, Britain went a step further and pressed for the revision of the whole Alliance strategy. The major British objective in their struggle for a new strategic doctrine was to put maximum weight on an early use of nuclear weapons. Despite criticism from their American counterparts, Britain proposed a draft of a new Political Directive, which established limits and objectives for the drafters of the strategic concept according to British wishes.⁶⁹

The attitude of France toward nuclear weapons at that time was rather ambivalent. On the one hand France was involved in expensive colonial conflicts. Those were mainly

⁶⁷ Stromseth, p. 16.

⁶⁸ "The British were anxious to reduce their forces in Europe for several reasons. In 1955, Britain suffered both inflation and a balance-of-payments deficit. Consequently, the cabinet had resolved to reduce domestic consumption and to stimulate exports. These twin objectives would be difficult if not impossible to achieve, however without reducing the size of British defense effort. The military budget was absorbing approximately 9 percent of Britain's GDP and was expected to rise substantially over the next four years. In addition, the defense program employed 7 percent of the work force, and it consumed 12 percent of the output of the metal using industries, which supplied half of Britain's exports, thereby restricting country's export potential. Finally, maintaining British troops abroad required a large amount of foreign exchange, and the situation was expected to worsen as West Germany phased out its annual support payments of 70 million pounds." Duffield, p.120.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 123-125.

guerilla conflicts for which nuclear weapons were useless. On the other hand French political leaders discovered that lost colonial wars and France's poor economic performance caused not only decline of morale in French armed forces but also influenced on French declining position with her NATO allies. In the opinion of Wilfrid L. Kohl "the failure of her allies to support her during the 1956 Suez crisis had a strong impact on French thinking; indeed many observers cite Suez as the turning point in France's decision to 'go nuclear.'"⁷⁰ It seems that both France and Great Britain in their decisions regarding nuclear weapons were driven mainly by domestic factors. However Great Britain already owned a status of a nuclear power and her attempts to change NATO strategy were motivated mainly by desire to utilize this opportunity to improve its own economic performance. France seemed to be motivated more to uphold her shrinking political status than to improve her economy.

Besides efforts to simplify NATO planning procedures, NATO military planners in the mid-1950s discovered that a shift in NATO strategy was possible. The goal was to produce two new documents for consideration by the Military Committee: MC 14/2, the "strategic concept," and MC 48/2, measures to implement the "strategic concept." Although there had been no intent to introduce new doctrine, the latest draft of MC 14/2 acknowledged the possibility of a limited conventional war in the NATO area, which was clearly contrary to the British position.⁷¹ Britain feared that this new NATO policy

⁷⁰ Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 29-36.

⁷¹ Duffield, p. 124.

would require a build up of conventional armed forces. Britain proposed its own draft of this Political Directive. Not surprisingly, the British proposal insisted on creating a reliable defense against the Soviet threat, without endangering the stability of the national economies of NATO members. Therefore, the British position was that conventional land, air and naval forces should be decreased to the necessary minimum and full responsibility for deterrence and defense of the West should be put on nuclear weapons. Eventually the British proposals were declined by the North Atlantic Council and the Political Directive called for attention to the problem of limited forms of aggression, and it created a place for limited responses to such by the “Shield” forces.⁷²

In May 1957, the North Atlantic Council formally adopted a new strategic concept, MC 14/2. The strategic assumptions in this document were much closer to the ideas expressed by NATO military planners than those made by British government. However, because of its political origins MC 14/2 was very ambiguous and open to different interpretations.⁷³

Additionally, the debate regarding NATO force structure in the second half of the 1950s brought an additional, unexpected outcome. It was:

...the emergence of SACEUR as an independent actor with a potentially significant influence over events. Gruenther and his staff at SHAPE, for instance, were instrumental in conceiving the conducting the studies that served as the basis for MC 48. Without that essential groundwork, the adoption of a new strategy would have taken much longer.⁷⁴

⁷² Ibid., p. 126.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 128.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

After Alfred Gruenther's tenure ended in November 1956, United States Air Force General Lauris Norstad occupied the position of SACEUR. During this first stage of NATO development, the alliance was transformed from a loose coalition to an international organization, which tried to coordinate many aspects of its member's policy. The dominance of the NATO military structure over its civilian counterpart was huge. The position of SACEUR (who possessed a loyal staff and as it was in the case of Gruenther and Norstad, was a close friend of the President of the United States) was much stronger than it was originally designed. NATO civilian structures at that time were already developing and did not have a strong enough leadership to resist their own position against the military's point of view. Moreover, NATO military staff, unlike its civilian counterparts at that time,⁷⁵ consisted mainly of American military personnel. For them, it was much easier to achieve a higher level of unity since they utilized the same standards and procedures, the same military culture and last but not least the same language. If we add the American military, political and economic strength, we must assume that American concepts of a defensive alliance dominated NATO debate about the alliance's goals. The unique situation, in which the president of the most powerful member of the alliance was the former SACEUR, gave his successors enormous advantages and opportunities to deal with the man who knew and understood precisely the same problems they were dealing with.

⁷⁵ Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952-1957. A Study in International Administration, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 146.

III. FROM “MASSIVE RETALIATION” TO “FLEXIBLE RESPONSE” 1957-1967

This chapter describes NATO strategic dilemmas regarding nuclear weapons since the late 1950s to the late 1960s. The following examines issues regarding the development of the concept of Multilateral Nuclear Forces (MLF) and the NATO debate over the adoption of Flexible Response. During this decade, NATO underwent internal processes that significantly changed the shape of this institution. One of the most important was establishment of the International Military Staff. It strengthened the position of soldiers inside the NATO bureaucracy, and created unique opportunities for them to influence the outcome of political debates, especially at the end of the 1980s.

I would also like to evaluate the policies and achievements of one of the most controversial SACEURs- General Lauris Norstad. His strong and unique personality raised new questions about civil-military relations in an alliance context.

A. LAURIS NORSTAD: SOLDIER? STATEMAN? DIPLOMAT?

In November 1956, U. S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad replaced General Alfred Gruenther as SACEUR and CINCEUR. Unlike his predecessors in this post, Norstad became known not only because of his performance as a soldier but also because, of his involvement into issues usually restricted to political leaders. His engagement in certain political initiatives occurred at a time when NATO faced the beginning of a decade of major political discord within the Alliance. The issue at stake was American nuclear deterrence and the credibility of the American defense of Europe. On 4 October 1957, the Soviets launched the first satellite - Sputnik. This event,

combined with earlier developments in the Soviet's nuclear capabilities, caused enormous change in the global security environment. At this time, it became obvious that the continental United States would become vulnerable to direct Soviet attack for the first time in the modern history. For America and the West this event was a shock:

As important was the general shock it provided to American self-confidence. The Russians had shown that they could match indeed exceed the Americans in technological sophistication. Previously the cold war had been a competition between economic systems. In the West the capitalist system had been expected to triumph because of its superior performance both in developing wealth and encouraging innovation. The communist system was viewed as being so rigid that it would not be able to meet the challenges of the modern world.⁷⁶

A sudden blow to western confidence in technological and economic superiority over the Soviets, Sputnik caused not only a transformation in military programs, especially increased investments in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), but it also raised doubts about the credibility of American commitments for defense of Europe. France was the first state to openly express these doubts:

For the French, Sputnik was simply the final proof that the Americans could not be counted on for the defense of Europe. If the Soviet Union could reach the United States with its missiles, the former invulnerability of America was destroyed; the last shred of 'massive retaliation' was also destroyed. Would the United States unleash its nuclear arsenal in the event of an invasion of the Continent if by doing so it would risk destruction of its own cities? The French answer was no.⁷⁷

Doubts regarding the credibility of the American commitment to Europe also called into doubt the credibility of the NATO strategy based on this commitment. Therefore, soon

⁷⁶ Freedman, p. 140.

⁷⁷ Kaplan, p. 85.

after NATO officially adopted MC 14/2, its value was compromised. Even before Sputnik had been launched, General Norstad undertook:

...a review of the alliance's minimum force requirements in Europe. Following the adoption of MC 14/2, each of the major NATO commanders was instructed to initiate such a study, and in the fall of 1957 their reports were combined into an overall estimate, labeled MC 70, which was to be considered by the foreign ministers in December. The exercise allowed Norstad to put his own construction on the vague language of MC 14/2, and in the process he significantly expanded the function of the Shield forces.⁷⁸

Norstad contemplated more than purely military changes in NATO forces. Even if he wanted to stay away from politics, Norstad would be unable to do so. Given the mutually contradicting interests of the allies at that time, all his decisions regarding NATO force posture must have concerned all members of the alliance. Formal approval of the strategic concepts in MC 14/2 did not solve the differences among NATO members regarding the status of their conventional forces. Forced by economic problems, the British insisted on reductions in conventional force structure and were inclined, despite all possible consequences, to declare unilateral cuts in its conventional forces. They argued that nuclear weapons should replace, to the highest possible extent, more expensive conventional forces:

⁷⁸ Duffield, p. 129.

By late November, substantial conventional force reductions seemed more imperative than ever. As a result of the Suez crisis, defense outlays had risen, while the British economic situation had deteriorated markedly. At the same time, the military setbacks suffered at Suez had increased the importance assigned by the British to the nuclear program, which was in high gear in preparation for the first British H-bomb test in May 1957. Nor had any of the other financial pressures that had prompted the British government to press for a review of NATO strategy abated.⁷⁹

In mid-December of 1956, the British government announced its decision about withdrawing about one-third of its armed forces from the continent.⁸⁰ For Norstad, it must have been a hard time. Just a month after being appointed to a new post, he had to face major politico-military crisis. Possible implications of this event might have been devastating for the Alliance. If the British decision were not approved, it might push Britain to withdraw from NATO. On the other hand, approval might have caused a dangerous precedent for the cohesiveness of the Alliance. If Britain were allowed to decrease its military contribution to the alliance on the basis economic problems, other allies might demand similar treatment when faced with similar problems. It is obvious that after a while NATO credibility would be more than doubtful. Moreover, despite its economic problems, Britain did not stop its nuclear program. One might ask what are the real priorities for British security policy. Was Britain really committed to common defense or was she only trying to develop her own nuclear arsenal at the expense of rest of the allies?

Soon it turned out that the major player in solving this crisis was the SACEUR:

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.138.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 138.

Since the SACEUR's advice was crucial for releasing Britain from its treaty obligation, Norstad took a leading role in the discussion among allies. In speeches on the both sides of the Atlantic, in press releases, in his invitation to the permanent representatives to attend major military exercise of SHAPE, and in his formal report to the Council of the Western European Union, Norstad sought to forestall the British move.⁸¹

The importance of his position was additionally strengthened by the uncomfortable situation of the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay. Lord Ismay had already made it clear that he would like to resign in the spring of 1957. Although deeply respected by all members of the Alliance, he found himself in a situation that required strong opposition to the demands of his own government. For Ismay, no matter how deeply engaged he was in creating the international civilian branch of NATO, he could not comfortably express his views, which were contrary to those of his government:

All the while Norstad was making headlines and trying to influence the policy of a major alliance power, Lord Ismay's voice was scarcely heard in public. Taking a position directly opposed to the declared national policy of a member of the alliance, especially his native country, was not his style. Furthermore, by the time the troop cuts were announced, Ismay had already let it be known that he would resign his sought to post in the spring of 1957. As his successor had already been picked, Ismay no longer commanded the full authority of his position.⁸²

Therefore, Norstad's voice must have sounded stronger. Originally, British requests for the cuts in its conventional forces were motivated by economic and financial crisis. The British Chiefs of Staff suggested that economic problems should be officially announced as a motive standing behind the decision of reduction. Contrary to this advice, the British

⁸¹ Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloom, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979, p. 49.

⁸² Ibid., p. 49.

government tried to negotiate these cuts on the basis of military considerations. Norstad's position corresponded to some extent with Lord Ismay's view and was sympathetic to the demands of British government:⁸³

Norstad later made it clear, however, that he would oppose the proposed reductions if they were based on the military argument that a smaller force equipped with nuclear weapons would be no less capable. He was concerned, moreover, that other countries would use the same argument to try to justify a reduction in their own NATO contributions. But if the British simply stated that they could not afford to provide more than 50,000 troops without endangering Britain's economic stability, he would do all he could to support them.⁸⁴

Norstad's willingness to resist the demands of national governments included all members of the Alliance, without exemptions for his native government. The United States' government had contemplated reductions in the overall size of its armed forces since 1956: some provisions of these plans assumed withdrawal of "approximately one half of an infantry division from Europe by mid-1959."⁸⁵ Admiral Arthur W. Radford prepared the most radical proposal. He proposed to reduce manpower by another 800,000, the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and increase reliance on long-

83 "He [Ismay] did, however, express one strong opinion: if economic reasons underlay the British decision to retrench those reasons and no others should be advanced. If a Britain were to try to soften the blow by rising the possibility of supplanting troops with fire power, then the signal might well be given for other NATO members to employ the same argument, in which case the ground troops composing the NATO shield would melt away." Ibid., p. 49.

84 Duffield, p. 139.

85 Ibid., p. 133.

range strategic bombers.⁸⁶ Norstad opposed these plans vigorously. He pointed out that the political reaction to this decision might be devastating for NATO:

Norstad was alarmed by this suggestion and put up fierce resistance. Pointing out how a disastrous chain of reaction had only been narrowly averted earlier in the year when the British had announced unilateral cuts, he argued that this was the worst possible time for the United States to reduce its combat forces in Europe. As a result of such opposition, the size of the army was ultimately reduced by only a further 30,000 men, which allowed the number of combat units in Europe to be kept constant.⁸⁷

Besides obligations connected with the duties of SACEUR, Norstad had a natural inclination for interference in politics. When Norstad was selected for this post, the weaker position of Lord Ismay allowed him to obtain more authority than was the case for previous SACEURs. Lord Ismay's successor, Paul-Henri Spaak, tried to regain the authority of the Secretary General, however, with Norstad as a counterpart, it was not an easy task:

Norstad was fascinated by politics -- perhaps more so than I am by the art of war. However, I gladly turned a blind eye to his interference in matters I considered to be within my own sphere of competence rather than his.⁸⁸

Spaak's successor, Dirk U. Stikker, was also unable to improve the balance between the civilian and military branches of NATO.⁸⁹ One may also assume that not only did

⁸⁶ Shwartz, p. 26.

⁸⁷ Duffield, pp. 133-134.

⁸⁸ Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memories of European, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, p. 263. "Eisenhower described Norstad as 'the best organizer he had ever met' Paul-Henri Spaak concluded that of all SACEURs, Norstad was 'one of the best'." Jordan and Bloom, Political Leadership, p. 48.

Norstad grew accustomed to his power, but also the NATO bureaucracy grew accustomed to the fact SACEUR was “more equal” than his civilian counterpart and his word had more weight than the Secretary General’s. Moreover, it seems that from the very beginning of his tenure Norstad, in the eyes of the public opinion, was a true leader of the alliance. Ismay’s successors on the position of NATO Secretary-General did not reach the level of respect he had enjoyed during his tenure. Due to various reasons, Spaak and Stikker found it impossible to compete with a young dynamic general.

Norstad very quickly established a good relationship with leading European politicians:

Norstad made it a practice to hold weekly meeting with France’s NATO diplomats, and General de Gaulle would see Norstad independently of the American NATO diplomatic mission, which forced the American permanent representative to inform himself through a third party. Norstad also frequently helped Spaak with the latter’s relations with the United States and helped the United States in its relations with Spaak. He also educated the practice of briefing the permanent representatives to educate them on nuclear affairs. Involved in rebuilding the *Bundeswehr*, Norstad and Chancellor Adenauer became friends and developed close personal relationship. Norstad by encouraging direct diplomatic dealings with SHAPE, acquired a prominent voice in NATO political affairs.⁹⁰

One can not say that members of the Alliance did not see that NATO’s center of gravity was shifting toward a more military than political alliance. However, this was not

89 “Spaak’s successor in 1961, Dirk U. Stikker of the Netherlands, had had a heart attack in 1959 and experienced more ill health, including cancer of the colon, during his tenure. This in itself gave more scope to the SACEUR and especially to one who had already been in his post for five years and who was accustomed to power and the international attention that came to him as a consequence.” Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 78.

90 Jordan and Bloom, Political Leadership, p. 83.

caused by Norstad's over involvement in political issues, "the Three Wise Men" report adopted by North Atlantic Council on 13 December 1956 pointed out that without stronger non-military cooperation among allies, NATO may lose its usefulness. Moreover, the report called for strengthening the role of the Secretary General.⁹¹ Practice, however, had proved that implementing these decisions was not an easy task. When Spaak demanded that all public statements of NATO military officials should be restricted, Norstad simply ignored this directive and was supported by SHAPE and by the NAC.⁹² This incident seems to prove that NATO political leaders knew very well who was really "in charge." Moreover, it looks like they preferred to cooperate with Norstad who had easy access to the President of the United States, therefore, his word had more gravity than the opinion of Spaak, who obviously did not have enough political support. It seems that even Spaak's own government did not want to defend the principles of civilian control.

Norstad's unwillingness to subordinate himself to regular procedures regarding official statements, covered not only international officials but also sometimes his native government:

⁹¹ "The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO," The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, Eleventh edition, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 399-400. With respect to the role of Secretary General and the International Staff the most interesting is Chapter VI, Articles 99-103.

⁹² Jordan, Generals in International Politics, pp. 78-79.

In a remarkable policy speech in Cincinnati in November 1957 -- a speech apparently not previously cleared through political channels -- Norstad introduced additional reasons for NATO's shield, which have come to be known as 'the pause concept.'⁹³

One may ask about the reason for such unusual behavior. Ignoring the chain of command, especially not long after the Truman-MacArthur case, could not be a good policy for any officer. Maybe in this case Norstad believed in his relationship with Eisenhower, but he must have known that Eisenhower sooner or later would leave office and that he would be left the without protection of his mentor. This state of affairs, in fact, took place after Kennedy replaced Eisenhower. Norstad probably was able to exercise such a level of independence due to his personal relationship with President Eisenhower. In the opinion of then Admiral David L. MacDonald:

General Norstad and President Eisenhower were close friends. When Norstad would come back to Washington he would go to see the President and there's no question but what the members of NATO felt that Norstad's actions had the complete backing of President Eisenhower. Rightly or wrongly, Norstad did not bother with the Pentagon.⁹⁴

B. MISSILES FOR EUROPE AND THE ISSUE OF MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCES

One of the most important inter-alliance debates in the late 1950s and the early 1960s was the debate over the Multilateral Nuclear Forces (MLF). This debate was an attempt to transform NATO into the fourth (after the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) nuclear power. The MLF debate brought questions about the reliability of the

⁹³ David Shwartz, NATO Nuclear Dilemmas, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1983, pp. 57-58.

⁹⁴ David L. MacDonald, Oral History Reminiscences, p. 259.

United States commitment to the defense of Europe to the attention of western decision-makers. Attention was focused on the possible role of nuclear and conventional weapons in modern war and the role of military professionals inside the alliance.

The debate about MLF began most probably on 27 May 1957. That day, United States...

Senator Henry Jackson (D. Washington) delivered a speech in the United States Senate entitled ‘Ballistic Seapower - Fourth Dimension of Warfare.’ It is possible to say that with this speech Senator Jackson opened what was to become the MLF debate.⁹⁵

In his speech, Jackson criticized the Eisenhower administration’s over-reliance on long-range bombers as a delivery means and emphasized the advantages of ballistic missiles, especially sea-based missiles. In his opinion, land-based missiles were too vulnerable to Soviet attack and could attract Soviet missiles close to the American cities. Jackson also pointed out that submarine-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) would be very hard to detect, therefore “a sea-based missile force should have an enormous appeal for our allies, especially in Europe. It could provide a maximum deterrent to Moscow with reduced danger to home territories. It would constitute a rational method of self-defense in the ballistic era.”⁹⁶ The desire to improve the nuclear capabilities of the United States’ allies clashed with the American policy of nuclear non-proliferation:

⁹⁵ Thomas C. Wiegele, “The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-1960,” *Orbis* 12:2 (1968), p. 466.

⁹⁶ Henry Jackson, “Ballistic Seapower -- Fourth Dimension of Warfare,” in Wiegele, p. 467.

Within the context of alliance politics, however, this aversion to proliferation has been selective. Although Washington did not actually encourage Britain's effort to develop nuclear weapons, it did little to block those efforts, and it eventually dared to comprehensive arrangements for Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear matters. Yet the United States actively sought to derail the French independent nuclear effort, partly because the French were using their program to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States, and partly because it was feared that a successful French program would stimulate West German interest in a similar program.⁹⁷

Contrary to this policy, in the late 1950s, Norstad began a public campaign advocating the improvement of NATO nuclear capabilities. In a series of speeches, Norstad called for "midrange ballistic missiles, land and sea based, and with great mobility, (that) should be made available to NATO as a part of a weapons modernization program, to meet presently assigned functions of this command."⁹⁸ Deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on the European continent must have had additional impact on Norstad's calls.

Norstad was doubtless an advocate of nuclear weapons in Europe. However, in his early estimates he pointed out that "shield" forces should have tactical nuclear capabilities. One may assume that he meant that the U. S. forces only should be reinforced with tactical nuclear weapons. The first American response to an increased Soviet nuclear capability was the "Thor-Jupiter offer." According to the plan, which was submitted to the President of the United States in February 1955, a number of IRBMs

⁹⁷ Shwartz, p. 10.

⁹⁸ Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 80.

should be deployed on the European continent or at sea.⁹⁹ There was no doubt that these missiles would be under full American control:

Nonetheless, the American plan provoked strong behind-the-scenes resistance, in advance of the formal offer, on the part of almost all the other allies. So strong were these private responses that on December 10, less than a week before the Paris conference, Secretary of State Dulles was compelled to assure the allies that 'there is no desire on the part of the United States to press these missiles in the hands or on the territory of any country that does not want them.'¹⁰⁰

In this case, Eisenhower and Dulles decided to select Norstad as their primal negotiator for this plan:

Placing the burden of requesting deployments on the shoulders of SACEUR was probably the most expedient face-saving move Dulles and Eisenhower could have chosen, since General Norstad, an admired and respected SACEUR, was in an excellent position to judge the political problems raised by such a request.¹⁰¹

While Norstad was canvassing the NATO European allies, negotiators were completing the details of the Anglo-American agreement of March 1957. The final agreement -- announced officially on 22 February 1958 -- allowed U. S. Thor missiles to be stationed at four Royal Air Force (RAF) bases. Although the authority to launch the missiles required "joint positive decision," all nuclear warheads would remain solely under the United States's jurisdiction, custody and control.¹⁰² Provisions of this

⁹⁹ Shwartz, p. 63.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 65-66.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 67.

agreement would later become a blueprint for the deployment of American nuclear weapons on the soil of other European allies.

The next approach to deploy American nuclear weapons to Europe was known as the “Norstad Plan:”

The concept was straightforward. Forces assigned to NATO might require access to nuclear weapons at some point in conflict with the Warsaw Pact. To assure that they would be given access when necessary, under appropriate political authority, a stockpile of nuclear weapons would be created for NATO, under SACEUR, that would supply relevant units with warheads after the North Atlantic Council authorized their release. Under the stockpile arrangements, delivery systems could be given to the allies in advance, so that once the weapons were released, it would be necessary only to match warheads with the already deployed delivery systems.¹⁰³

The offer of IRBMs fit into this concept very well and received Norstad’s support. In the late 1950s, and especially in 1959, Norstad seemed to be heavily involved in the negotiations regarding different projects. He became, at this time, almost an independent political actor developing his own concepts and pursuing his own goals.

When the IRBM negotiations approached their final stage, SHAPE became the focus of a series of consultations between Britain, France and West Germany mediated by SACEUR. It is unlikely that the Eisenhower administration had any direct role in these consultations, considering its opposition to any aid to the French nuclear effort.¹⁰⁴

The Norstad Plan, for different reasons, never came into existence. First, the United State’s defense bureaucracy called into doubt the military usefulness of Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MMRBMs). One of the arguments was that relatively small number of these missiles did not significantly improve overall nuclear capability of

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

NATO.¹⁰⁵ Another factor was probably Norstad's increasing distance from the main centers of decision-making in Washington:

As early as 1957 he had aroused controversy and confusion within the United States and NATO over his pronouncement of the pause doctrine. He had also met with strong rebuff in a premature attempt to shift NATO doctrine toward greater flexibility and greater recognition of the importance of conventional forces within NATO overall capabilities. Perhaps leaders in Washington, increasingly irritated by his maverick behavior, wanted to undermine his position and objectives, yet at the same time constrained, because of Norstad's general popularity among European leaders, against doing so openly. Thus they were willing to let Norstad conduct his negotiation at SHAPE and were even willing to give him support at various times, but deliberately did little to bring the initiative from the bargaining table to the implementation stage.¹⁰⁶

All possible developments in NATO nuclear weapon sharing were deadlocked by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that prohibited any U. S. administration from sharing its nuclear capabilities. The MacMahon act was amended in July 1958, "but not until the Administration had given its repeated assurances that the United States would not surrender the slightest measure of control over its nuclear weapons within the Atlantic Alliance."¹⁰⁷

At the same time, Norstad began a public campaign advocating a change in the alliance's nuclear policy. The cornerstone of this proposal was a plan to create nuclear

¹⁰⁵ "Even if 700 MMRBMs were deployed, it was argued, SACEUR would still have to rely on U. S. strategic nuclear weapons." *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁰⁷ Wiegele, p. 473.

forces within NATO.¹⁰⁸ This campaign most probably reached its climax in a major address to the Sixth Annual NATO Parliamentarian's Conference in November 1960. In his speech, he called for the modernization of nuclear forces assigned to Europe. Taking into account the increase in the Soviet nuclear stockpile in Europe, he requested that NATO be transformed into the fourth nuclear power. In his plan, NATO nuclear forces would be designed for and targeted against Soviet IRBMs stationed in Eastern Europe, not against Soviet ballistic missiles deep within the territory of the Soviet Union. Moreover, "this force was to be assigned to SACEUR. Presumably, the use of this force would be at the discretion of SACEUR, with the approval of the President of the United States."¹⁰⁹ Additionally Norstad suggested creating a pool of strategic nuclear weapons, which would be available to all NATO members, and would be under equal control of all allies.¹¹⁰

One may ask about the origins of this project. For Norstad, the timing of this speech seemed to be very unfavorable:

Taking into account that in the spring of 1960 Norstad had encountered a particularly hostile and suspicious Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, it is rather surprising that he would suggest such a broad program.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ On August 25, 1959, speech to the American Legion in Minneapolis; on December 6, 1959, speech to the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Southern California. *Ibid.*, pp. 477-78.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 484.

Why did he submit this proposal? Thomas Wiegele suggests that Norstad was trying to influence the outcome of intra-administration discussion in the United States:

It must be assumed that Norstad's twofold proposal was of his own making, in all likelihood, an attempt to influence Administration policy. It was not, strictly speaking an official proposal, but it was an important suggestion in the continuing development of the MLF concept, coming as it did from the principal military figure of the alliance.¹¹²

If the motives described above were true, it seems that he succeeded to some extent. At the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris in December 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter made an offer, which somewhat reflected Norstad's ideas:

He noted America's willingness to assign to NATO five Polaris missile submarines, soon to be built as the initial phase of the U. S. Polaris program. He also suggested that Washington would look favorably on a European request to put 100 U. S. - built MRBMs out to sea in addition to the five Polaris submarines, as the centerpiece of a NATO nuclear force.¹¹³

Contrary to Norstad's plans, Herter insisted on sea based nuclear forces in his proposal. This change was probably caused by administration fears that land-based MRBMs might cause serious political turbulence.¹¹⁴ Fears about the possible success of Norstad's initiative were so serious that:

¹¹² Ibid., p. 484.

¹¹³ Shwartz, p. 83.

¹¹⁴ "Norstad's efforts to create his land-based MRBM force caused concern within the State Department. Many officials feared that such a force would grant West Germany too much access to long-range nuclear weapons, which in turn aggravate U. S.-Soviet relations and U. S.-French relations. Furthermore-so these officials reasoned- it would provide additional impetus for German political insecurities, already stimulated by France's decision to build its own nuclear force." Ibid., p. 83.

...the director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, Gerard Smith, persuaded Herter to call on Robert Bowie of Harvard, an old friend of Smith's and a former Policy Planning Staff director, to study serious alternatives to a Norstad's proposals in the context of a broad examination of the tasks facing the Alliance community in the 1960s.¹¹⁵

One must admit that not every American commander faced such a serious concern regarding his plans. The Bowie's Plan recommended strengthening NATO conventional forces to provide adequate answer for conventional attack on Europe combined with creation of NATO strategic nuclear forces.¹¹⁶ From Norstad's point of view, the most important part of the Bowie plan was the proposal to assign American nuclear missiles to SACEUR:

The first phase would consist of assigning some number of American strategic missile submarines to SACEUR, who would be granted authority in advance to launch the force under certain specific circumstances. To launch the force otherwise, he would need the approval of the North Atlantic Council, with the understanding that the United States would concur in the judgement of the council.¹¹⁷

This plan, if materialized, undoubtedly would strengthen the position of SACEUR. Despite all means of protecting NATO nuclear missiles against unauthorized launch, all European countries interested in participating in this project would have to consult with SACEUR with respect to nuclear policy. Most probably, it would create additional tensions between military and civilian NATO officials. In this conflict, SACEUR's civilian counterpart would be in a no-win situation. According to these plans,

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

¹¹⁶ John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. New Dimension of Political Analysis, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 188.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 84.

SACEUR would be in charge of these weapons and therefore SACEUR, not the Secretary General, would be consulted about nuclear policy and connected issues. In other words, SACEUR could become the fourth most powerful person on earth. If he was authorized in advance to launch nuclear missiles, even if strictly controlled by the President of the United States, SACEUR's immediate power would increase dramatically. The MLF concept finally failed, not because it brought more power to SACEUR. It seemed that the only European power really interested in developing the MLF concept was Germany. France was interested in developing its own independent nuclear force and Britain agreed to participate in this plan, hoping that it would never materialize.¹¹⁸ However, the interest expressed by the German government caused more problems than good. One motive behind the MLF concept was to give Germany a share in nuclear policy to prevent them from developing solely German nuclear weapons; the other was the overwhelming desire to keep Germany as far from nuclear trigger as possible. Finally, President Lyndon B. Johnson killed the MLF concept on 6 December 1964. The talks about the MLF lasted for another year, but after that day, the administration allowed the MLF concept to fade away.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ "More plausible is the assumption that the British believed-correctly, as events were to show-that the prospects of the MLF ever coming into being were remote enough to permit them to agree to assign their Polaris submarines to the MLF without being ever having to make good on the pledge. In this belief they were bolstered by Kennedy's acknowledgment, shortly after Nassau, that any circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons might be contemplated by the alliance would by definition place Britain's "supreme national interest" at stake. *Ibid.*, p.104.

¹¹⁹ "To clarify his intentions further, he [Johnson] also promulgated a new decision document that forbade any more U. S. pressure until the Europeans had a chance to formulate a common position, and noted that any future agreement on a joint nuclear

It seems clear that General Norstad as a SACEUR played an important role, especially in the early developmental stages of the MLF concept. Often, he played the central role in negotiations among European members of NATO. Eisenhower must have appreciated his political skills, since he chosen Norstad to negotiate with the Europeans concerning the proposal for deploying American MRBMs to Europe. Therefore, one may ask about the origins of Norstad's power. Was he capable, despite the protests of some NATO civilian officials, to interfere in the sphere of international policy just because of his own virtues or because he had the strong support of the President of the United States? So far, it seems that even if he did not have the support of the President, Norstad would have tried to interfere with at least some issues in international security policy. The prerogatives of the position of SACEUR gave him countless opportunities to do so. Besides it was (and it still is) impossible to exclude any SACEUR from the policy planning process, especially when military expertise is necessary to formulate, evaluate and, if necessary, adjust the very basic assumption of state and alliance security. A person like Norstad certainly would not miss an opportunity to influence the outcome of any debate. Moreover, "Norstad believed that the supreme commander was the 'heart' of 'this, the greatest alliance that ever existed.'"¹²⁰

defense would have to have strong backing of both Great Britain and West Germany, as well as be at last acceptable to France. Furthermore, Johnson said, any future arrangements would have to be compatible with European unity. These requirements effectively killed the MLF." Ibid., p. 122.

¹²⁰ L. James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier for his Time, Washington, DC: Brasey's, Press, 1997, p. 316.

C. NATO AND THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 1961-1968

Connected with the debate about the role of nuclear weapons, the second issue was the changes in the NATO strategic concept, which dominated interalliance debate in the late 1950s and in the beginning of 1960s.¹²¹ After the North Atlantic Council adopted the strategic concept in MC 14/2, critics began to question basic assumptions of this document. Even today, interpretation of this doctrine raises problems. Some scholars believe that this document represented a step toward withdrawal from the doctrine of “massive retaliation,” while others believe that it was a continuation of such policy.¹²²

This chapter assumes that MC 14/2 was created as a continuation of the “New Look” policy and the doctrine of “Massive Retaliation.” The following examines the role of NATO staff and SACEUR in creating and advocating plans, which eventually lead to the adoption of “Flexible Response.” An excellent account of the NATO internal planning process can be found in a doctoral dissertation by then member of this Staff Colonel, later General, Edward L. Rowny. Findings in this chapter are based mainly on his dissertation.

The doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” was criticized from its inception. The most important argument against “Massive Retaliation” was its lack of strategic credibility in a limited conflict that fell short of all-out nuclear war. The strategic assumptions

¹²¹ Stromseth and Duffield also disagree on a specific date of adopting MC14/2 by the NAC. Duffield says this document was adopted in May 1957, while Stromseth argues that it happened in December 1956. Duffield, p. 112, Stromseth, p. 18.

¹²² Duffield, p. 112.

underlying the “New Look” were challenged from the start, particularly the notion that a capacity for “massive retaliation” was a sufficient deterrent to all possible forms of Soviet aggression. Some of the most forceful critiques emerged in the writings of a number of strategic analysts outside the United States government, including William W. Kaufmann and Bernard Brodie.¹²³

These critics, however, did not prevail in either the United States nor in NATO, they did cause second thoughts about the recently adopted strategy. By 1957, Secretary of State Dulles began to modify his earlier emphasis on massive nuclear retaliatory power as a sufficient deterrent to all forms of aggression. He acknowledged that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and the devastating consequences of a nuclear war diminished the credibility of all-out nuclear retaliation as a deterrent to local aggression. In his view, the United States now required a more flexible military posture, which would:

...convince U. S. allies that local attacks can be countered without necessarily inviting all-out nuclear war and would decrease the danger of local conflicts which might ‘escalate’ into general war.¹²⁴

At the same time when doubts were raised about basic nuclear assumptions, NATO staff officers developed a study that suggested the changes in alliance strategy later to be found in the “Flexible Response” strategy. Colonel Richard C. Stilwell developed the study, which:

¹²³ Stromseth, p. 15.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

Contained explicit rationale for the adoption within NATO of a ‘flexible response’ - type strategy, as discussed above. His study deviated from the explicit rejection in the former strategy of possibility of limited war taking place in Europe. While the Stilwell study refrained from using the term ‘limited war,’ the possibility of such conflict was made implicit.¹²⁵

Stilwell’s study called for delaying the use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict until the moment that conventional forces would be incapable of countering a Warsaw Pact attack. Moreover, Stilwell’s study called for a significant increase in NATO tactical nuclear weapons as well as improvements in the NATO decision-making process for early use of these weapons. Stilwell suggested that decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons should be assigned in advance to NATO commanders. In his analysis, Stilwell also emphasized the importance of an immediate response and introduced the concept of “deliberate escalation.”¹²⁶ While prepared in his NATO office (Strategic Study Group) and with the cooperation with his group, Stilwell’s study was recognized as his own initiative. Upon completing his study, Stilwell forwarded it to SACEUR.¹²⁷ Although he could pass his study almost directly to SACEUR using the existing informal connection between SACEUR and the American liaison office in NATO, Stilwell decided to follow the regular chain of command. Since every SACEUR is also Commander in Chief, United States Forces Europe (USCINCEUR) there is an opportunity for American officers in NATO to communicate directly to SACEUR. On one hand, the existence of such a link is convenient for better coordination between

¹²⁵ Rowny, p. 178.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 179.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 181-86.

American and European components of NATO. On the other hand, the existence of this link allows American officers in NATO to bypass the regular NATO chain of command. It is not clear why Stilwell decided to forward his study through the regular chain of command. Maybe, he believed that the issue was not so important that it would require using the informal connection. It is also possible that forwarding his study through the regular chain of command allowed his superiors to get acquainted with the study and express their opinions.

After receiving the study, General Norstad asked Colonel Stilwell to prepare a briefing for him on the contents of his study. Norstad invited the entire intervening chain of command to this briefing, which allowed him to accomplish several purposes. First, it permitted officers at a number of levels to give their own viewpoints orally and off-the-record. Second, it permitted Norstad to transmit his own strongly held views directly to Colonel Stilwell without any concern that his views would be watered down or variously interpreted. And third, it established a basis for subsequent direct communication with Colonel Stilwell. Over a period of the next several weeks, Colonel Stilwell found himself repeatedly summoned to meetings with General Norstad during which the latter expressed a deep personal interest in the study and injected many of his own ideas.¹²⁸ After the briefing, Norstad ordered his staff to prepare a summarized version of the study to distribute it among decision-makers in the United States and on the Continent. Another version of the study was presented to the NATO Military Committee. This presentation was prepared under the direct scrutiny of Norstad. The summarized version

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 186

of the study, along with Norstad's plans, was distributed among some influential European political leaders.¹²⁹ In Rowny's opinion, Norstad's presentation of Stilwell's study to the Military Committee was well accepted by the members of the Committee:

Most of the members of the Military Committee were convinced of the correctness of the suggested new strategy, even though few dared, because of domestic pressures at home, to publicly espouse a change in basic strategy for NATO.¹³⁰

One may point out that many NATO governments strongly favored the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" at that time, therefore publicly expressing views that contradicted this policy might have been regarded as disloyal towards the respective governments. Issues regarding changes in official policy were usually debated in private before being announced to the public. Thus, national representatives in the Military Committee could not have expressed their opinions publicly. Norstad, after receiving feedback from his presentation, was concerned that even if representatives in the Military Committee shared his opinion, they were not willing to promote this study among their respective governments. He decided to forward this study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as CINCEUR, not as SACEUR. The decision to forward the study directly to his superiors was not a very "politically correct" move. Norstad was aware that Eisenhower administration was against any option of limited war in Europe. Moreover, by forwarding the study, Norstad also acted against the stated policy of his service:

¹²⁹ "Additionally, General Norstad used three personal friends -- Ambassador Andre de Staercke (the Belgian Perm Rep [sic] to NATO), Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, and M. Jean Monnet of France, to spread his ideas among Europe's political leaders." Ibid., p. 187.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 187-88.

It is of more than passing interest that Norstad, who had risen through the ranks of the U. S. Air Force, proposed a strategy containing ideas considered heretical by his own Service—especially since the Services were at the time fiercely engaged in controversy over roles and missions. At its core, this interservice controversy within the U. S. military establishment was simple—any doctrine of limited war in Europe would divert portions of the U. S. budget from the heavily strategically oriented Air Force to the Army and Navy.¹³¹

As expected, Norstad's proposal received a rather cool reception. The study was passed from the JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson and then to President Eisenhower who, “reportedly unhappy” with his former protégé, did not act upon the study but sent it back to the Pentagon for “further study.”¹³² Among high-ranking Washington officials only General Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff supported the study.¹³³ It is due to his recommendation that the study was brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and eventually the President.

It is not clear if Norstad believed that the Commander-in-Chief would accept his plan. If he was aware (and it seems that he was) about sentiments in Washington regarding possible changes in NATO strategic concept, he should not have been surprised about President's decision. Although Norstad did not lobby intensively in Washington for careful debate on the Stilwell study, he played a much more active role in European

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 188.

¹³² Ibid., p. 189.

¹³³ General Taylor was so frustrated “over these obstacles that he resigned and published a revealing memoir and critique of the Eisenhower administration's defense policy.” Shwartz, p. 139.

capitals.¹³⁴ His efforts, however, did not bring any visible, immediate effects. It was a new American administration and its views on American and NATO strategy that brought changes into the alliance strategy.

The question one might ask is why Stilwell and later Norstad decided to propose fundamental changes in the recently adopted political doctrine of the alliance. Norstad, with his brilliant political sense and analytic skills, must have known that in this situation his proposal had no chance in the decision-making circles in Washington. Moreover, his proposition countered the current opinions of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Chiefs of Staff of Navy and Air Force and the President. According to Rowny:

Stilwell was motivated by his belief that he had arrived at the correct solution to NATO's strategic problem, and by his high standards of professionalism. Stilwell believed that he was acting in the best national interest of the United States and therefore saw no conflict between its interests and the broader interests of NATO as a whole. In a similar fashion General Norstad viewed a change in strategy as being in the best interest of both NATO and the United States and therefore championed the need for a change.¹³⁵

The breakthrough in a debate about new NATO strategy came together with the new American administration in 1960/1961.

D. NORSTAD AND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION 1960-1963

After Norstad's retirement, the NATO debate about "Flexible Response" and nuclear weapons in Europe continued. Eventually the doctrine of "Flexible Response"

¹³⁴ "Throughout this period General Norstad met on a weekly basis with the Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom, France and Germany and somewhat less frequently with other senior military leaders of the NATO partners. Norstad promoted measures that would support the 'flexible response'-type strategy." *Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

was adopted by the NAC in December 1967. Moreover, NATO introduced the Nuclear Planning Group (1966) designed to solve the problem of the participation of European members of the alliance in the nuclear decision-making process. SHAPE did not stay passive during these events. As soon as Robert McNamara delivered his speech in Athens on 2 May 1962, the SHAPE staff noticed that the Athens guidelines were parallel to the Stilwell study. Therefore, SHAPE “quickly edited the study and labeled it ‘MC 14/3 Draft’.”¹³⁶

MC 14/3 Draft was duly coordinated among the various staff sections within SHAPE as it was processed, this time, through international channels. Furthermore, Allard, as did others in SHAPE, felt a sense of loyalty toward general Norstad who sent it to the Standing Group for coordination at national levels prior to its submission to the Military Committee.¹³⁷

After the Draft was approved by the SACEUR and forwarded to the Standing Group, additional copies were distributed among the National Military Representatives “for information.” Thus, all the members of the alliance (although most of them informally) were able to get acquainted with this document. Then, in June 1962, the Standing Group requested comments or concurrence from all of the Ministers of Defense in the Alliance, but by mid November it became clear that France, Germany and the United Kingdom decided, for different reasons, not to comment on the Draft of MC 14/3.¹³⁸ It soon turned out that it was the beginning of a stalemate within the alliance.

¹³⁶ Rowny, p.193.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 194.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 197-198.

The deadlock was solved only when France withdrew from the alliance military structure (1966/1967).

The change in the administration had twofold consequences for Norstad. One reason was the Kennedy administration's views on the American and NATO strategies, which were quite similar to Norstad's views:

Kennedy's interests in developing more flexible options than the stark alternatives of 'devastation or submission' rested in part on his recognition of the increasing vulnerability of the American homeland as the Soviet Union developed its own strategic nuclear arsenal. However, he did not regard a nuclear attack as the most likely threat posed by the Soviet Union. Kennedy was also concerned about the danger of a nuclear war by accident or 'miscalculation' in which both sides were caught in a situation that might unintentionally escalate to an all-out war, though misunderstanding or the sudden spreading of a limited conflict because of inflexible war plans.¹³⁹

For NATO and for Norstad, the most important part of Kennedy's views was the belief that nuclear weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons, were not a sufficient substitute for conventional weapons. Kennedy believed that non-nuclear ground forces were necessary to defend NATO territory and would not pose the same risk to civilian populations as nuclear weapons. During the Eisenhower Administration, he criticized the manpower cuts made in the American ground forces, as well as the failure to provide modern conventional weapons or airlift and sealift capabilities.¹⁴⁰

Norstad, despite the fact that he shared some of the new administration views, was not the most favorite character for the new administration. It is not easy to determine

¹³⁹ Stromseth, p. 26.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

the real reason for the change in the position of the SACEUR that took place in 1963.

The most often repeated explanation is Norstad's connection with the Eisenhower administration.

Norstad was convinced that, too, he was considered a Republican partisan and the Kennedy administration regarded him as a reminder of the Eisenhower administration's successes in NATO:¹⁴¹

However, his successor (Lyman Lemnitzer) was no less connected with Eisenhower than was Norstad. In the opinion of L. James Binder, personal factors were at least as much important as political connections:

Lemnitzer's identification with a previous administration was even stronger than Norstad's, but McNamara undoubtedly found it easier to get along with him than his outspoken predecessor did.¹⁴²

An additional factor might have been the Lemnitzer's difference in defining the role of the alliance and the respective allies in the global political perspective, especially with respect to competition with the Soviet Union. During his term as a SACEUR, Norstad was well known as an advocate of European unity and a strong European dimension in the Atlantic Alliance. This lead Norstad to the proposal of making NATO a fourth nuclear power. For the Kennedy administration, these views were an anathema.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Binder, p. 317.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 318.

¹⁴³ "With the change of administration from Eisenhower to Kennedy, a direct clash occurred between Norstad and Washington, which Norstad was bound to loose. The Kennedy administration felt that its policy of nonproliferation and centralized control ruled out a NATO nuclear force that was not ultimately a subject to American veto. To Norstad this was almost a vote of no confidence in SACEUR, whose wings, in effect, were being clipped." Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 82.

Norstad was fully aware of these differences, however, he believed that he had the full support of the President. According to retired Lt. General William J. McCaffrey's account (quoted in the biography of Lyman L. Lemnitzer), Norstad told him, "Bill, the president and I have very similar views on how to handle the situation in Europe. I am aware of the differences with Defense and State, and I am confident the president will support me."¹⁴⁴

If Norstad really believed in what he told McCaffrey, it did not last long. During this conversation, McCaffrey told Norstad that the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense was undertaking an effort to get rid of him as SACEUR. Norstad was too good of a political player to deceive himself, given the number of signals he received, he knew he was not a favorite of the Kennedy administration as a candidate for SACEUR. After the conversation, which took place in SHAPE with two unidentified U. S. secretaries, Norstad told his senior staff that his loyalty to the United States was being called into question:

Gentlemen, we aren't going to be together very much longer. If they can't put up with me after this and I can't put up with them...one way or another, it's going to come to an end.¹⁴⁵

Norstad retirement was announced in mid-1962 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, was picked for his successor. However, the Cuban Missile crisis delayed the change. Finally, on 1 January 1963 Norstad stepped down and Lemnitzer became the new SACEUR. The era of what might be called the

¹⁴⁴ Binder, p. 317.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 316.

“proconsular” period in the history of SACEUR had closed. The Kennedy administration’s reluctance to make NATO a nuclear power according to Norstad’s vision was clearly stated by the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who said he “would not favor” Norstad’s plan.¹⁴⁶

It is hard to determine the factor that caused Norstad’s fall. Was it a difference in political objectives between the SACEUR and the Kennedy administration or was it a clash of personalities between Norstad and McNamara? I would argue that in this case, the reasons behind Norstad’s retirement were a combination of two factors. The case of Norstad proves that any SACEUR that wants to conduct successful policy has to fulfill two basic requirements:

The SACEUR, along with the secretary-general, must speak for and on behalf of all the Alliance, while not alienating himself from the Alliance’s largest and most powerful member, the United States. If the SACEUR finds himself caught in the middle, then in the final analysis he must be prepared to suffer the consequences, as was Norstad’s fate.¹⁴⁷

Norstad not only found himself in conflict with the Kennedy administration with respect to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO and the overall role of NATO, but he also did not try to behave in a more “politically correct” manner. A good example of Norstad’s attitude was his approach toward civilian control. Norstad respected this goal because the ultimate control in NATO lay with the North Atlantic Council, but unlike his successor, he “got away with taking political matters into his own hands.”¹⁴⁸ Besides:

¹⁴⁶ Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 83.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁴⁸ Binder, p. 317.

He had reputation for having a strong personality and the ability to make decisions quickly and clearly. He liked delving into NATO politics, and his stature and judgement were such that the civilian leadership into whose areas he often strayed tended not to challenge him.¹⁴⁹

One might argue that contrary to Norstad, Lemnitzer was a better diplomat. While Norstad never hesitated to put his hands on a certain political action or to express his views regarding a certain issue, Lemnitzer was more cautious, even tempered, and “could get along with just about anyone.”¹⁵⁰ It does not mean that Lemnitzer was not able to resist decisions that he had found unwise.¹⁵¹ One can not say that any of these two high ranking NATO military officers disobeyed orders from the highest NATO authority, the North Atlantic Council. Nonetheless, the gravity of the SACEUR’s position in the alliance allowed them to influence decisions restricted for their political superiors.

There is no doubt that Norstad was “one of the most influential as well as one of the most controversial of the distinguished occupants of this vitally important-and unique position.”¹⁵² Beside excellent organizational skills Norstad also presented:

...an adept political mind and good instincts for the relationship necessary for the cultivation of power. ‘General Norstad,’ wrote one commentator, ‘epitomizes the new generation of United States soldier-statesman-diplomats.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 318.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 318.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 312-38.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁵³ Jordan and Bloom, Political Leadership, p. 83.

Moreover, Lauris Norstad, due to his personal inclinations into the politics became one of the most influential figures in the alliance. His civilian counterparts, although not amateurs in political and bureaucratic skirmishing, were unable to exercise a similar level of power.

The problems NATO had been facing since the late 1950s were not solved until the second half of the 1960s. France's withdrawal from integrated military structure paved the way for the adoption of MC14/3 in December 1967, also known as "Flexible Response." France not only withdrew its own forces from NATO structures but also requested a quick removal of almost all NATO military installations from the French soil. This request forced NATO to organize a rapid relocation of its installations from France to other states. This situation created unexpected benefits for NATO:

A by-product of moving NATO institutions from Paris and Washington to Brussels was the dissolution of the Standing Group (SG). This was replaced by an International Military Staff (IMS) in which all nations were represented. Even more significant was the creation of the Special Committee—generally known as the McNamara Committee—which was designed to improve channels for the USA to inform and consult with its allies regarding nuclear matters. This was succeeded by the Nuclear Planning Group in December 1966, and the NPG rapidly developed into an important nuclear clearing house.¹⁵⁴

Moreover, moving NATO headquarters from France to its new location in Belgium separated the civilian and the military staff. SHAPE headquarters had been

¹⁵⁴ Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. The Crisis of Credibility 1966-1967, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 389.

placed 40 miles south of Brussels. This separation limited the SACEUR's visits in Brussels and reduced his influence upon the political decision-making process.¹⁵⁵

It did not take International Military Staff much time to become operational within NATO structures. However, the biggest challenge for IMS appeared at the end of the 1980's. The sudden collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union required the rapid adjustment of NATO's doctrine and strategy. While civilian diplomats were unable to provide NATO with timely solutions, their military counterparts seemed to be ready to replace them.

¹⁵⁵ Rowny, p. 142.

IV. NATO AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War NATO had one very clear enemy. This country was the Soviet Union. On the brink of the 1980s and 1990s, not only did the Warsaw Pact collapse, but also former Soviet “allies” regained their independence and the Soviet Union was demised. This chapter examines NATO’s adaptation to the changes in the security of Europe in the early 1990s. The following evaluates the role played by the International Military Staff in this process.

A. THREE REVOLUTIONS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

During the Cold War, a major task of NATO was to defend the Alliance against the Soviet threat. The strategic concept of NATO was subordinated to the idea of the defense of Western Europe, as well as Northern America. Within the military structure of NATO this task meant that all possible means were focused on the defense of a sudden all out attack on Western Europe. The whole structure of the armed forces, staffs and defense system was prepared for this sole scenario. The reality of international relations was a strong competition between two hostile superpowers and almost all aspects of the Alliance were subordinated to this. However, after revolutionary changes in the military, the political and economic situation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, questions about new challenges must have been asked.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ “The demise of the Soviet Union marked the third revolution in the European security situation. The first revolution, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the CFE treaties, ended the need to anticipate a strategic surprise attack on the NATO area. The second revolution the fall of the Wall, followed by the political revolutions in various Eastern European countries and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, reinforced this. For the NATO countries it made possible a shift from troops on a high state of readiness

One of the most important factors during the revolution of 1989-1995 was its pace. The changes in the international security situation were so rapid that after only two years NATO faced a situation where the old enemy disappeared and questions about NATO's future utility had been asked. Up to this date, the major task for NATO had been to prevent, deter and defend against the Soviet threat. To fulfill this task successfully, strong cooperation between members of the Alliance had to be achieved:

Another explanation of the intensive military cooperation-operation between the NATO partners is provided by the theory of a balance of power. Co-operation was essential because no solitary European State was able to defend itself against the Soviet Union and its satellites.¹⁵⁷

The “Red Scare,” however, hasn’t been the only factor that has enhanced the members of the Alliance to develop mutual cooperation. Some of the members of NATO recognized early that mutual cooperation allows smaller countries to affect the process of political dispute between superpowers. Moreover, this engagement virtually obliged the

to mobilisable troops. It was also becoming increasingly clear that growing instability outside the treaty area could produce unforeseen risks for the NATO countries. This required more mobility and flexibility of the forces so that they would be in a better position to be deployed in an unknown environment, possibly a long way from home. Furthermore, limited adjustments were made in the total size of the forces and the ‘force and command structure.’ It was assumed that the Soviet Union still constituted a considerable ‘residual threat’, so planners had to take into account the technical military possibility of a strategic attack against the NATO area. These arguments, which formed the basis of the Alliance Strategic Concept, had now been undermined by the demise of the Soviet Union. The question to consider now was whether a new revolutionary change in the security situation might rekindle the old threat. This question was important in connection with NATO’s future as a collective defense organization. The third revolution in the security situation called the basic assumption of the Alliance Strategic Concept into question.” Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁵⁷ Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, London, UK: Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 1997, p. 6.

United States to respect interests important for its smaller partner policy goals, even if it might collide with its own.¹⁵⁸ The North Atlantic Council adopted an official NATO political strategy in December 1967. The document known as “The Future Tasks of the Atlantic Alliance” (*Harmel Report*) furnished NATO with two major functions. The first was:

...to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. The second function was to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.¹⁵⁹

The military dimension of this document was adopting the strategy of “Flexible Response.” But after the Soviet Union collapsed, its former satellite states rapidly changed their political systems and foreign policy goals. It was not hard to recognize that, since 1990, the existing shape of NATO was becoming more and more obsolete. If the Alliance wanted to survive, it had to find answers for questions about its future usefulness and new missions.

One of the first attempts to answer these questions was given in February 1990 by a German member of the International Military Staff, Colonel Klaus Wittman. His paper was an answer to the question about consequences for the NATO military strategy of changes in the international security situation. The main assumption of the “Wittman Paper” was that “arms control negotiations would proceed smoothly and that the CFE

¹⁵⁸ Risse-Kappen.

¹⁵⁹ The Future Tasks of the Alliance (*Harmel Report*), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 14 December 1967, Sect. 5, in Rob de Wijk, p. 7.

treaty would be signed in 1990.”¹⁶⁰ Moreover, in Wittman’s opinion, the Soviet Union would lose its satellites and withdraw militarily, as well as politically from Eastern Europe. However, it should still be considered as a superpower. But although Wittman considered the Soviet Union militarily capable to launch an all out attack against NATO countries, he had found this scenario very unlikely. This assumption drove him to the conclusion that in the new political and security environment “NATO and Warsaw Pact would play primarily political role, coordinating such things as national attitudes to arms control and implementation of arms control strategies.”¹⁶¹ The most important observation in his study was that the threat became much less predictable, therefore the current state of NATO’s military structure required substantial changes. The threat of an all out attack from the Soviet Union was very unlikely:

Much more likely become non-traditional threats, such as conflicts between nationalities and ethnic groups, religious fundamentalism terrorism and the destabilizing influences of stagnating economies.¹⁶²

The conclusion from this assumption was that NATO should undertake significant changes in its military structure. Units much more flexible and easy to deploy into a crisis should replace conventional units.¹⁶³ Wittman’s vision met many opponents from the civilian as well as the military NATO bureaucracy. Politicians wanted to wait until the international situation clarified before they undertook any steps to change the official

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 14.

NATO doctrine of “Flexible Response” and “Forward Defense.” Moreover, in public declarations NATO officials stated that “Flexible Response” is fully capable of meeting new challenges. They were also aware of the fact that changes in the strategy would require long negotiations, which could undermine NATO’s unity. At this time, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, John Galvin, also opposed a review and changes of NATO’s strategy:

He considered that the present strategy had been shown over the past decades to be flexible enough not to be undermined by changes in security situation. The reason for Galvin’s attitude was that he assumed that there were still 110 Soviet divisions reserved for a European war and that on NATO’s flanks there were even indications of a build up of Soviet potential.¹⁶⁴

This criticism didn’t stop work on this study. The International Military Staff decided to continue the job and asked various NATO military headquarters for an input on this study. It created a situation when, despite official criticism, the military bureaucracy continued their job and became involved in cooperating with other military organizations (SHAPE, military headquarters), as well as military representatives in the capitals of the Alliance. In the opinion of some scholars, there were German military representatives who were most interested in adjustment of NATO goals and structures to the new situation. Since, according to these scholars, the German *Bündeswehr* was the least national and the most alliance-oriented component of all members of the alliance, German officers were those who were the strongest advocates of utilizing the transformation in the Central and Eastern Europe. If NATO reacted fast enough for the

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

events in this region, it could help secure changes in a security environment in the whole continent.¹⁶⁵

One conclusion occurred from these deliberations. In order to establish a draft review of strategy, military analysts required at least informal political guidance. It is worth mentioning that the military required from their civilian colleagues, guidance that was almost a “mission impossible” at that time. Since the second half of the 1989, the political situation in Europe and in some parts of Asia had grown highly unpredictable. Political circumstances were changing so rapidly in so broad an area that political guidance for review of military strategy could not provide a clear political assessment of the future situation. Nevertheless, during a ministerial session of the Defense Planning Committee of May 1990, the ministers asked the Military Committee to continue its job.

France, although not present in the Defense Planning Committee or the NATO Military Committee at that time, was from the very beginning involved in this work. Her representatives were able to participate in the process through the attendance of French representatives from their missions to the Military Committee, thanks to agreement among the 15 Allies of the integrated structure to allow them to participate.

Officially the ‘green light’ to the process of review and transformation of NATO strategy was given to the military authorities during the London NATO summit on 5 and 6 July 1990:

¹⁶⁵ Donald Abenheim and Richard Hoffman in conversation with the author on June 9, 1998.

The London Declaration ‘On a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance’ stated that NATO, although remaining an alliance for collective defense must adjust to the changing circumstances. The transformation of NATO was linked to the implementation of the CFE treaty and a package of measures to inspire confidence and promote security which were being negotiated in the CSCE.¹⁶⁶

The Military Committee also received the requested political guidance. But the political guidelines for NATO military authorities reflected a state of confusion among NATO political decision-makers regarding deep changes in Europe. Thus the guidance so obtained, didn’t suffice for members of the Military Committee. The changes announced in the *Final Communiqué* required a decrease of the readiness level of NATO’s armed forces. The most important shift in NATO’s overall construction was a shift from instant military effectiveness in the nuclear era to political solidarity in the post-cold-war era, which seemed to be much more desirable in the new phase.

B. THE TRIPLE-TRACK DEBATE

Rapid changes in an international environment forced the NATO authorities to undertake steps that would allow the alliance force structure to be more sufficient to the new situation and possible challenges. One of these factors was the unification of Germany in October 1990. After the unification proved to be a political fact, the concept of forward defense became obsolete and required total revision:

This (the unification) made concept of forward defense unworkable for military operations and required accelerated adaptation of the structure of the NATO armed forces and NATO defense concept.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ de Wijk, p. 17.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

The other factors that affected the work on the strategy review were also connected with changes in Eastern Europe. Relations with Warsaw Pact countries improved very quickly. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded in the middle of 1991, but even long before the formal act of finishing the life of this institution, its military as well as political effectiveness were called into doubt. Many Western governments were inclined to take advantage of this situation and reduce their military spending:

On 25 September 1990 the ambassadors of the troop-supplying countries in Germany handed in letters to the department of foreign affairs in Bonn in which the new situation that would arise from reunification of Germany was anticipated.... The aim was to reduce the number of NATO troops in Germany from 407,000 to around 150,000, of whom approximately 50 per cent would be supplied by the United States.¹⁶⁸

The work on strategy review began soon after the Defense Planning Committee meeting in May 1990. The NATO civilian part entrusted strategy review to the Defense Review Committee. Its chairman, Assistant Secretary General Michael Legge, opted for preparing two separate documents. First would be a general political evaluation and necessary recommendations. Then, based on this document, the military strategy would be developed. At the same time, the Military Committee was inclined to the proposition of the "ad hoc working group from both the International Staff and the International Military Staff should establish the political framework. These guidelines should subsequently be approved by the Defense Planning Committee and translated into corrective directives."¹⁶⁹ Thus, the military division of NATO bureaucracy would be in

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

charge of preparing political guidance, as well as, military directives. At the same time, Secretary General Manfred Wörner presented his own vision of deliberations on the strategy review. He insisted that the strategy review should be taken in a two-track approach:

The first track would generate general principles and the second the military strategy itself. The development of the new strategy was to be an iterative process in which both tracks would be developed parallel to each other and military advice would be sought for the first track.¹⁷⁰

Before the work on the review of the NATO strategy went on, NATO had to solve the bureaucratic deadlock between its civilian and military parts. Legge wanted to establish first the political framework and then develop the military strategy, while the Military Committee preferred to develop both documents simultaneously and considered review of the military part as its own prerogative.

Besides this situation, there were two other problems to solve. Firstly, not all countries were equally interested in the review, being afraid that strategy review meant review of NATO's entire security policy. The second problem was connected with participation of France in this process. But at least in this case, consensus was quickly achieved due to the mutual interests of both parts (NATO 15 plus France). Eventually, compromise was reached that work would be carried out on three tracks and France would be involved with all three tracks:

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

The first track consisted of series of brainstorming sessions by the NATO ambassadors in the Permanent Council.... They were to philosophize about the Alliance's future tasks from a broad political perspective; this was to ultimately lead to the summit political declaration. Second, the International Staff's Strategy Review Group began working with narrower approach on a new political strategy to provide guidelines for the future structure of NATO armed forces and military operational concepts and doctrines. The third track was the responsibility of the Military Authorities. They were charged with developing NATO's military strategy. Together the second and third tracks were to replace the old strategy. The different perspectives of the military and civilian-political parts of NATO alone turned out to be enough to prevent the discussion in the various committees from complementing each other perfectly.¹⁷¹

The first brainstorming session was held on 5 October 1990. It quickly turned out that among variety of different subjects one of the most important issues was a problem of the European security identity and the European pillar of NATO. The main advocate of "Europenization" of the Alliance, not surprisingly, turned out to be France. The French seemed to be also concerned about the future position of Germany in a unified Europe. The position of the United States was pretty clear. As long as transatlantic relations were secured, the United States did not oppose European identity. Great Britain's position was similar to that of the Americans. However, after several months of discussions, the only consensus the countries were able to reach was that sometimes it would be better to use the WEU rather than NATO and the European defense identity should not duplicate NATO.

The second most debated issue turned out to be problems concerned with future role of NATO. The question of the future role of NATO was immediately involved with the problems of out of area operations.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 23.

In the early days of the Alliance, neither America nor Europe was eager to be engaged in the partner's overseas adventures. Americans were afraid of being involved in the colonial wars of some European powers. Europe on the other hand was afraid of the American policy in Korea and later in Vietnam. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major task of the Alliance defending the members against an all out war with the "Evil Empire" was obsolete and out-of-area operations seemed to be much more likely. The ambassadors faced the necessity to agree on the possibility of conducting out of the area operations. They also accepted the necessity of decreasing number of forces, as well as creating forces that were more mobile, flexible and multifunctional. The great advocate of out of area operations turned out to be Secretary General Manfred Wörner.

The fact, which cleared the way for a new approach to this issue, was the Gulf War of 1990:

In response to the Gulf crisis, the idea of 'passive solidarity' emerged. This concerned the possibility of individual NATO countries participating in an operation which was not being carried out under the NATO flag, but in which was being made of NATO facilities such as infrastructure, collective equipment such as airborne radar (AWACS), procedures and cooperation-ordination of sea transport.¹⁷²

Finally, compromise was reached and expressed in the *Final Communiqué* of the ministerial NATO Council in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991.¹⁷³ Additionally, to the Communiqué there was announced a document describing the core security functions of

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁷³ "NATO must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that have direct implications on our security." North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué* (Ministerial Meeting), Copenhagen, Denmark, 6-7 June 1991, Sect. 10, in de Wijk, p. 28.

the Alliance, known later as the “fundamental security tasks.” To achieve these objectives, NATO had to become an institution for consultations among allies against any possible threat to their vital interests. They also needed to “provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe... deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state, preserve strategic balance within Europe.”¹⁷⁴ It was obvious that these functions were designed to satisfy all possible demands requested by NATO members.

Two problems seem to be important for the evaluation of the outcome of the brainstorming sessions. First, it was the idea proposed by Hans-Dietrich Gensher and James Baker to invite Central and Eastern European countries for deeper cooperation with NATO, which soon became the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The main objective to this new institution was to serve as a forum of consultation about problems related to security issues and democratic civil-military relations.

The second factor was a significant amount of attention given to the problems of European security identity and strengthening of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This shift was probably connected with an attempt to appease some of the demands from France and Germany. It could also reflect changes in the priorities of European security. Since the Soviet Union was on the edge of collapse, the “red scare” was losing its privileged position. A clear reflection of this tendency was

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

a discussion about deleting from the final text of the document, a paragraph about NATO's fundamental security tasks' remarks about the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁵

The Strategy Review Group began its meetings on 14 September 1990. It quickly turned out that the major obstacle to real progress was the residual perception of the Soviet Union as a major (cold war style) threat to NATO members. Moreover, the Soviet Union still perceived NATO as a major threat to its vital interests, but a number of its former satellite states decreased significantly and some of them like Poland and Hungary had demonstrated that they were going to look for closer relations with the Atlantic Alliance. During the second draft of the strategy, perception of threat, despite American argument, was focused much more on diversity of security risks than on the Soviet threat. The nuclear issue was also brought to the table and France also adopted a more assertive approach to discussions.¹⁷⁶ It seemed that France was becoming more and more involved in the current problems of the Alliance.

¹⁷⁵ The original text ended with the additional words '...bearing in mind in particular the military power of the Soviet Union'. During the Council meeting Dumas, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted however that this last part of the text be scrapped. It was in fact a curious final clause because it gave the impression that NATO's primary *raison d'être* was possible Soviet threat. An attempt to obtain an explicit strategic balance with the Soviet Union could mean that drastic extra reductions in the armed forces on the NATO side would be possible. After all, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact had dramatically altered the military power relationship in Europe in NATO's favor. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁷⁶ As the strategy development proceeded the French input became more pronounced. In the most crucial debates the French tactic turned out to be one of acting with restraint in the initial phases of the negotiations and then, at a later stage, generally after exhortations from other allies, becoming more intensively involved. France accepted responsibility for rewriting the main part of the political framework for the fourth version, which was completed at the end of March 1991. At the same time the growing French involvement made the text negotiations more complex and as a result some

Another proposal was to transfer some elements from the military section of the document to its civilian part to make the overall document acceptable to France. Finally, after deliberations on over 10 drafts of the final document, the Strategy Review Group was unable to reach an agreement, mainly with issues concerning the status of nuclear weapons and two alternative documents were presented to the heads of government:

The nuclear sections reached an impasse with the French wish to see their nuclear weapons explicitly mentioned. Here France found support from fellow nuclear power, the United Kingdom. The Italians, however, continued to have major objections to the equal treatment of the British, French and American nuclear arsenals. The Council was also unable to agree on the issue of 'weapons of last resort', the term which had been introduced in the London Declaration but now seemed destined to disappear. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany were concerned that continued use of this term could lead to calls for a 'No first use' declarations and a debate on the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe.¹⁷⁷

Then the Military Strategy Working Group began its work on a document entitled "A Military Assessment of Factors of Change with Regard to NATO's Military Strategy."¹⁷⁸

In contrast to the discussions within the Strategy Review Group, more emphasis was placed on threats other than the Soviet Union and therefore on another interpretation of crisis management. The central question in this document was how to react to unforeseen threats on the periphery of NATO's territory.¹⁷⁹

sections were given a clear French signature. This was the clearest in texts on the necessity of a European security identity and a prominent role for the WEU. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

This assumption allowed the group to give more attention towards developing a concept for an out of area operation. It also meant that the readiness level of troops could be decreased. Also, the title of the document reflected a general assumption that the group was preparing NATO's military strategy for a major shift.¹⁸⁰ But not all allies were ready for the change and the controversies were solved during the Defense Planning Committee ministerial meeting on 12 and 13 December 1991.¹⁸¹ In the final document, security risks for the NATO area were described as unpredictable, moreover, more attention was given to military operations during peacetime within the framework of military cooperation:

Flexibility and mobility were therefore considered critical factors in the success of armed forces. At least some of NATO's forces needed to be very mobile. This required increased attention for transport capacities, logistics and infrastructure and applied equally to army, navy and air force. Multinationality would place higher demands on interpretability and exercises.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ The document's title was the subject of a discussion similar to that held in the Strategy Review Group. Proposals with politically correct titles, which incorporated words such as 'peace', and 'stability' had been tabled. It had also been proposed that the title be MC 14/4 or as an alternative, MC 15 to show even more clearly that it presented a change of course. Ultimately the choice fell on MC 400, "MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept." *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁸¹ None of the members, however, considered an active role outside the treaty area appropriate for NATO and finally a compromise was reached. In line with the Allied Strategic Concept, it was stated that individual allies could act outside treaty area. In such a case NATO infrastructure and "crisis management arrangements" could play an important role and even the NATO military Authorities could, after a political green light, provide support. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

These goals required changes in the level of readiness, force structure, etc. The Defense Planning Committee charged the “Future Force Structure Working Group” with developing basic principles on this topic in more details. Finally, the Military Committee approved document MC 317 “NATO Force Structure for the mid-1990s and Beyond,” which was developed to parallel the Alliance Strategic Concept and was approved by the Military Committee and the Defense Planning Committee. One of the most important factors which influenced the:

...formation of the new strategy was the decision to involve France in its development. Paris signed the new strategy as a whole. After an initial reluctance, later revealed as a tactical step, Paris agreed and subsequently became gradually involved in all facets and left its impression on the whole document. France succeeded in removing sensitive points from the strategy document and in having pet French topics included.¹⁸³

Besides, there is no doubt that the new Alliance Strategic Concept reflected the changes in the security environment of Europe. More attention was given to out of the area operations, rapid reaction forces and new dimensions of security like political, military, economic, human, social and environmental factors.¹⁸⁴ To achieve this

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁸⁴ Now security had been given political, military, economic, human or social and environmental dimension. This meant that NATO would have to be just one of the organizations playing a role in the promotion of peace and security. The European Union, for example, definitely had a role to play in the economic area, and the CSCE was important for the human dimension. This represented the birth of the concept of “interlocking institutions.” The emphasis on co-operation and dialogue was also new. The diplomatic contacts, which NATO maintained with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, built upon this dialogue; increased co-operation was visible in the foundation of the NACC. Much however, remained unchanged. NATO was still a collective defense organization. As far as the military guidelines were concerned, a new approach different from the NATO strategy of flexible response was sought. This military strategy was based upon the threat of massive, surprise attack by the Warsaw

objective (redesigning part of its basic assumption) NATO had to define new challenges consisting in a new security environment, find appropriate (acceptable by all members) goals in that situation and measures which would allow NATO to be efficient enough in these circumstances.

It turned out that it was necessary to provide dialogue among partners at three different levels. General political assumptions, the political dimension of the review of the strategy and military approach to respective factors and the general idea of strategy. It was necessary to allow all respective partners (including France) to fully participate in this process. This decision to work out this issue at different levels was also to some extent the product of bureaucratic argument between the civilian and military part of NATO and probably personal ambitions.

C. NEW SECURITY ARCHITECHTURE IN EUROPE

The event, which affected the very essence of NATO was disbanding the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991 and forming in its place the Commonwealth of Independent States. The very first question was whether there was a need for NATO. In fact, evaporating the main enemy required serious debate over the future goals of the Alliance. The very first reactions were not very favorable for the future of the Alliance. Some

pact under the leadership of the Soviet Union. There was a consensus that for NATO as a whole operations outside the treaty area were inappropriate, although incidental support could be provided to the individual allies. This meant at the same time that crisis management and conflict prevention, two of the most important foundations of the new strategy, were seen in the light of differences or armed conflicts which could form a direct threat to the treaty area. Second collective defense was to be carried out with forces, which were at a lesser state of readiness but were more mobile and more flexible. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-47.

members of the American senate advocated for “adapting the Alliance to the current capabilities.”¹⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, France was also a great advocate of this option.¹⁸⁶

The position of NATO was heavily affected not only by the demise of the Soviet Union but also by developments in other institutions in the international security environment, especially CSCE, WEU and NACC. The new security situation in Europe gave new possibilities to some European institutions established during the Cold War, but without any significant role in the world divided between two competing blocks. One of the first organizations, which surprisingly got a chance to play more important role, was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

The Netherlands in particular brought initiatives relating to the ‘demand side’ in the CSCE and the ‘supply side’ in NATO. The thought behind this was to distinguish between ‘mandate-issuing’ organizations (UN and CSCE) and ‘executive organizations’ (NATO, WEU). This was in line with the concept of interlocking institutions, whereby organizations such as CSCE, NATO, NACC and WEU would have a clearly defined function and would complement and reinforce each other.¹⁸⁷

During this time, it was obvious that the only institution, which could provide a significant military asset to peacekeeping operations in Europe, was NATO. All attempts

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁸⁶ France also took an extremely critical attitude within NATO. Paris continued to press for a division of functions between NATO and WEU. The French view appeared to be based mainly on power politics. The argument was simple: the most likely reason for deploying soldiers is not collective defense of the NATO area, but crisis management outside it. If France could claim operations outside the NATO area for the WEU, the position of the WEU would be strengthen and NATO could become increasingly superfluous. This would achieve what Paris had had in mind since deGaulle: reduction of the influence of the United States in European security matters and therefore a stronger French influence on them. Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

undertaken by the United Nations and CSCE in Yugoslavia failed. But before this, on 17 December 1992, the North Atlantic Council declared that NATO was willing to accept the United Nation's political umbrella "to maintain international peace and security." NATO had to provide an internal dispute about its participation into humanitarian and peacekeeping operations:

Like the Alliance Strategic Concept the concept for operations outside the treaty area was worked out using several tracks. Discussion began in the Permanent Council. During the brainstorming of 15 June 1992, the Secretary General suggested that the International Staff should draw up a list of political subjects to be dealt with the council. The list was already available by the Council meeting of 15 July, immediately after the ministerial conference in Oslo. Also before the Council was the first military input for discussion, presented by the Military Committee. The ambassadors decided that both documents, which at this juncture were aimed entirely at the development of peacekeeping concept, needed to be developed in more detail. The Military Committee was given the task of writing a report on the military support of peacekeeping operations, and the Senior Political Committee was to develop the political framework for these activities. Discussion in the Senior Political Committee about peacekeeping missions from the very beginning was dominated by debate between France, supported to some extends by Spain and Belgium, and the other members of the Alliance. France insisted that peacekeeping mission should be led by the CSCE while the U. S. suggested that NATO was more suitable institution for that kind of activities.¹⁸⁸

The deadlock between the countries was suggesting a broader approach to peacekeeping and those insisting on a narrower approach were very quickly reached. Although the committee prepared some drafts, they had not been finally approved by the Permanent Council. On the other hand, however, members of the Military Committee had received an unofficial paper from their colleagues (representing countries favoring the broader

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

approach) and the Political Committee regarding political issues connected with peacekeeping, including things like common training and exercises:

The paper took also into account the participation of central and eastern European countries. Contrary to the work of Senior Political Committee the Military Committee was proceeding fast (maybe because of the absence of the French representative). After two months only the committee handed to the Secretary General memorandum 'Military Planning Document for Possible NATO Military Support to CSCE Peacekeeping Activities.' The memorandum, which was developed in conjunction with the work of the Senior Political Committee, contained directives for operational planning by the Major NATO commanders and listed subjects which needed more detailed elucidation in the decision-making and planning process. An appendix contained the requested catalogue of military options for peacekeeping operations. This involved an enumeration of military activities, which could be used, extending from lending support for operations carried out by other organizations, to independently carrying out the whole operation.¹⁸⁹

On 25 and 26 May 1993 NATO's ministers of defense decided that the collective defense would remain NATO's main goal. However, they also agreed that the term "crisis management" could be referred to the crisis representing a direct threat to the Alliance, as well as, "crisis outside treaty area where intervention could take place on the basis from the CSCE or the UN."¹⁹⁰ The expression of "crisis management" caused many troubles with a specific definition and problems connected with adapting this idea to the overall NATO concept. "A breakthrough came with the guideline that 'crisis management' operations outside the treaty area must be expressed in the capabilities and the armed forces structures."¹⁹¹ Finally, the document MC 327 "NATO Military

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 63.

Planning for Peace Support Operations" was handed to the Secretary General. But without an agreement on political guidelines regarding peacekeeping operations, it was impossible to approve this document. In the meantime, the problem of cooperation with Central and East European countries (some of them members of the Warsaw Pact) occurred. For NATO the main problem, once again, was the attitude of France, which wanted to minimize the possible role of a new institution NACC.¹⁹²

During preparations for the NATO Brussels summit, two new initiatives had appeared. First, during an informal meeting of ministers of defense in Travemunde on 19-21 October 1993, Les Aspin proposed to create the Partnership for Peace. The second issue, presented also by Aspin during the same meeting, was an issue of a "Combined Joint Task Force" concept - CJTF. Before the Brussels summit, NATO didn't achieve accord about both issues but during the summit, both ideas were politically accepted. It gave, of course, new impetus to the transformation process.

But the issue that began the real discussion about the alliance was the problem of NATO's enlargement. For at least some "Partners," especially Poland and Hungary, membership in PfP was a price necessary to pay for an admission to NATO. Political debate about membership began openly after President's Clinton statement on 13 October 1993 in which he said that NATO would be enlarged. To provide political guidelines for this process and to gain necessary consultation time, the Senior Political Committee, reinforced by military experts, was charged with conducting a study about the

¹⁹² France was the only country to have great reservations that the NACC could undermine other forms of European co-operation, especially within the CSCE. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

enlargement of NATO. The reinforced Senior Political Committee (SPC-R) worked at the level of deputy permanent representative under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Gebhardt Von Moltke.¹⁹³ Of course, this construct gave all of the capitals great influence on the work. For the SPC(R) additional papers had been written. The International Staff proposed a paper dealing with the issue of NATO's future contribution into the security and stability of Europe.¹⁹⁴ The Military Transitional Issues Working Group wrote additional papers on the subject of enlargement. These papers referred to the challenges of the future integrated military structure and a possible form of future participation in this structure.¹⁹⁵ It turned out, by the way, that even the countries that were long time members of the Alliance had different opinions on the proper meaning of this phrase.¹⁹⁶

Parallel to the debate about the enlargement of NATO, the authorities discussed problems connected with the CJTF issue. After the Brussels summit, the Military Committee was charged with the objective to develop a solid CJTF concept. In its work, the Military Committee had to develop a more flexible and mobile structure than the currently existing military structure. This structure also had to be composed into the new political reality in Europe, which would allow NATO to undertake out of the area missions. In other words, this new structure had to fit the ESDI concept. The first draft

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 94.

of the report had been drawn up without the proper political guidelines. To solve this problem a new group was found, the Provisional Policy Coordination Group, which was to prepare clear political recommendations. The main problem was, once again, the position of France, which at that time wanted to have access to the collective NATO means (through WEU) without the necessity of obtaining American approval beforehand. This position met vigorous resistance not only from the USA, but also from other members of the Alliance.¹⁹⁷ The PPCG objective, which originally was to be achieved within a couple weeks, had not been realized after two years of discussion.

In the meantime, it turned out that primary objectives applied originally to the CJTF concept became more and more obsolete. It was also a concern of the military authorities of the Alliance that the overall NATO military concept should better fit with the security environment in Europe. Without officially calling into doubt the value of the Alliance Strategic Concept, on 20 September 1994 the Chiefs of the Defense Staffs approved developing a new study known as the Long Term Study:¹⁹⁸

They also agreed to an approach in two phases. Phase 1A provided a work plan that was based on completing the study within two years. Phase 1B aimed at reforming the conceptual aspects of MC 400. Phase 2 was to concentrate on specific elaboration's; in Phase 2A the conceptual aspects were to be interpreted in terms of more specific military needs, while in Phase 2B particular subjects to be defined later were to be worked out in detail. After Phase 1A was accomplished, Chiefs of the Defense Staffs officially invited France to participate in further development of Phase 1B.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁹⁹ de Wijk, p. 103.

Despite controversies with the NAC, which failed again in developing proper political guidelines, “in November, Phase 2A, in which it was explained how the conceptual basic principles were to be military expressed was completed.” After that, on 28 November 1995 the Chiefs of Defense Staffs in the Military Committee approved the new MC 400/1 and forwarded it to Secretary General for political approval.²⁰⁰ During the same meeting, the Chiefs of Staffs decided that new MC 400/1 was not specific enough to derive directly from it new command structure (Phase 2B).²⁰¹ The new “Bridging Paper” was developed, which was good enough for developing a new NATO command structure. But this issue required political acceptance, “which could involve France in the development of the new command structure and open the door for French and possibly Spanish accession to the renewed integrated military structure of NATO.”²⁰² Rapprochement of France into the integrated military structure was possible after a series of failures of French policy especially with respect to ESDI. It became clear that most of the French European partners depend badly on the American presence in Europe. After the end of the Cold War, most European countries reduced their military budgets which didn’t give much hope for a credible separate European military organization. Even France itself was unable to conduct large-scale military operations without American support. New French policy towards European security became a necessity.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 105.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 106.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 106.

V. CONCLUSIONS

There is a story, popular within the halls of the U. S. Mission to NATO that during the Carter Administration one of the foreign service officers in the European division of the State Department had a stamp prepared for use on all papers concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The stamp, the story goes, read simply, 'NATO, at this time of unprecedented crisis within the Alliance...'.²⁰³

Whether the stamp in question ever existed is not important. However, the story shows that the perception of NATO, even among those involved in its deeds, is a history of conflicts. From the very beginning of its existence, cooperation among its members was very problematic and has been achieved only after hard negotiations. One should not be surprised of that since NATO was to provide answers for the very essential threats for the security of its members. Since its origin, NATO was organized as a double pillar organization. The military pillar was to provide defense against the Soviet threat. The civilian pillar was to improve cooperation in the non-military dimension among the members. However, from the beginning, this division was uneven and the NATO military part got more attention than the civilian did. It should not be a surprise to anyone since the perception of the Soviet threat was very strong.

The members of the NATO military staff did not restrain themselves from entering into the area of political decision-making. Since military expertise is crucial for the development of political decision, the opinion of the military should be included into

²⁰³ S. Nelson Drew, "From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in Transition, 1989-1994," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996, p. 3.

this process. However, it seems that NATO military officials did not want to wait to be asked about critical issues. Especially when General Norstad occupied the position of SACEUR. It seems that during his tenure, he was the leading power of the Alliance who never hesitated to express his own views, even regarding issues, which laid in the prerogatives of his civilian partners. His close affiliation with President Eisenhower could only help him to exercise more power than any other member of NATO. After the Kennedy administration came to power, a direct clash between Norstad and some Kennedy officials occurred. Since the new administration was not willing to allow Norstad to exercise his privileged position in the Alliance, the end of the “proconsular” era in the history of SACEUR’s was inevitable.

Soon after Norstad’s retirement, the debate over the new strategic concept in the Alliance was over. The adoption of a new strategy and the withdrawal of France from NATO’s military structure forced the Alliance to undertake reforms of its own internal structure. Dissolution of the Standing Group and the establishment of the International Military Staff allowed for a genuine internationalization of the NATO military staff. This decision also gave NATO military authorities additional organizations useful for military, as well as, political planning. It seems that in the NATO decision-making process, especially during crisis, the more important role is played not by high level officials but by small committees, where compromise is being reached.

In general, key documents did not get final consideration in the MC, DPC, or North Atlantic Council until compromises on the critical points had been found in smaller circle or in bilateral talks.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Haftendorf, p. 388.

The International Military Staff quickly proved to be effective and influential institution. Since the late 1980s, the IMS was able to initiate debate on issues vital for the Alliance without any incentive from military or civilian authorities or even without their approval. In 1989, the Alliance faced a very unique situation caused by the rapid collapse of the opposing empire, which forced NATO to undertake the internal process of evaluation and adaptation towards new challenges. Political and military authorities of the Alliance noticed remarkable changes in the security environment. In this context the military authorities, rather than the civilian authorities, again initiated the work of preparing the Alliance for necessary changes. These decisions of the NATO military bureaucracy also forced politicians to undertake a debate among political authorities of NATO on the future of the alliance. It seems that during the process of changes in Europe after 1989, it was the NATO military bureaucracy, not its civil-political counterpart, which initiated discussion about necessary changes.

During this process of NATO's adaptation, military planners, who wanted to begin serious discussion about the internal situation of the Alliance, did not openly call into doubt the existing concepts or structures. Usually, the first input used came from informal studies or papers prepared in NATO military offices. Discussion about an issue was then conducted at a low level within already existing committees. If an idea was accepted it was usually forwarded to the superiors and then to the civilian branch of NATO. During these years, military decision-makers complained to their civilian colleagues that because of the lack of political consensus they could not carry on their

work. It turned out, at least a couple of times, that there were military who pressed their civilian colleagues to undertake decisions or accept concepts that were already developed by the military. It seems also that the military bureaucracy was more flexible about considering changes. If it was necessary to achieve the desired outcome, new committees were established or separate bodies for discussing the special issues:

Because of deep-seated political differences of opinion and very different agendas, much of the work of the civil bureaucracy got bogged down and it was virtually impossible to provide the military with political guidelines.²⁰⁵

The military turned out to be more flexible than their civilian counterparts for the demands of the external situation, not only during the brink of the 1980's and 1990's, but throughout the whole history of the alliance. They seemed to work faster, recognized threats earlier and developed solutions quicker. In a nutshell, they proved to be more efficient. NATO, as a whole, seemed to be driven by external political changes and internal dispute, in which the military branch of the Alliance was more sensitive to the demands and challenges of each new era.

The impact of the NATO military staff on the development of a political decision was very strong from the beginning of the alliance. Soldiers inside NATO headquarters had a very comfortable position. They could recommend certain political actions based on the expertise of military assessment without taking into account the gravity of political consequences. In the early stages of NATO's existence, their position inside NATO structures could not be challenged by their civilian counterparts. Since the NATO

military staff was less dependent on their national governments than it was on the civilians, soldiers became “the glue” of the alliance. It is interesting that during the two periods of strong debate inside the alliance studied here, there were military members who prepared assessments of the situation and proposed necessary measures to solve the problem.

The informal power of top military officials (SACEUR) might have been used, as it was in the case of Norstad, to obtain more influence than it was originally designed for this position. The question one would want to ask is what are possible consequences of this involvement of soldiers into the world of politics. Is it good or is it bad for NATO or what does it mean for the future of this organization, as well as, for the future shape of civil-military relations? Since soldiers respect the guidance of NATO’s ultimate body – the North Atlantic Council -- one should not worry about the future of civil-military relations inside NATO. Military expertise may counterbalance political debate with concrete recommendation. Moreover, military expertise may provide arguments for the good of the whole alliance not only for its particular members. Therefore, one should not be afraid of the military’s occasional entrance into the realm of politics. One should, however, provide them with a better understanding of the nature of the political process and debate at the international level. It seems that the NATO military and civilian structures are very closely related to each other. The case of Norstad and of the case of the IMS prove that the NATO military personnel are willing and capable of fulfilling the political vacuum in case of weak civilian leadership. The case of IMS points to issues of

²⁰⁵ de Wijk, p.119.

the character of leadership, no matter civilian or military. When Norstad occupied the position of SACEUR his strong personality dominated, not only the military, but also the civilian structures of the alliance. His character and his friendship with General Eisenhower allowed him impose his personal views on many issues regarding the policy of the alliance. NATO policy makers, being aware of these unusual circumstances, accepted Norstad's role and influence and cooperated with a military individual who exercised, however informal, the authority of the most powerful members of the alliance.

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